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MULTIPLICITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER¹

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It is generally assumed that in fighting Germany we were fighting a specific doctrine of life. Many crusaders are now in search of the doctrine which has brought on this iniquitous war. To hunt down the German philosophy has become a favorite indoor sport. But what is the result? The result threatens to blur all distinctions. The adjective "German" now connotes everything and denotes nothing. If, for instance, the national *differentia* of both German philosophy and German politics be Egotism, as has been maintained, many doctrines having their origins outside the boundaries of Germany would have to be defined as "German." Again, if Germany's national trait be "Absolutism" in logic and morals (and this too has been seriously held), what shall we do with Belgium? Shall we call her German because in defiance of all consequences she remained *absolutely* true to her duty? Not Germany but Belgium is the nation that acted in conformity with Kant's Categorical Imperative. If it is true that America's national philosophy is pragmatism, then the "masters" of Germany are entitled to American citizenship. It is

¹ An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, February 22, 1918.

Germany who has rejected absolute standards of right and wrong, or truth and error. Her official documents, are they not essays in applied pragmatism? In them we shall find exemplified the pragmatic notions of truth and goodness. Only in a world in which truth is fluent and changing can yesterday's sacred pledge become today's "scrap of paper." And who knows whether today's treaty of peace will not become *spurlos versenkt* tomorrow! It would take but little mental agility to link the crimes of Germany not only with pragmatism but with any and every philosophy.

The truth is that philosophies are not essentially national, nor are nations essentially philosophical. Philosophic attitudes are general. They can be correlated with national tendencies in but a very superficial and arbitrary way. Idealism, for instance, is an attitude which finds voice among all nations, in all ages. The same holds of materialism, realism, empiricism, rationalism, mysticism, and all the other definable views. To establish a definite one-to-one correspondence between nations and philosophic systems is to mutilate the facts of history. Nations as well as philosophic doctrines grow and change, acting and reacting upon one another. A system of ideas which may be said to predominate in a nation at one period is at another eschewed by it. The ruling philosophy of one people soon gains mastery over another. The fortunes of Platonism come here to mind. A more recent instance is the pilgrimage of Hegel's philosophy. The type of idealism to which Hegel gave expression became the dominant philosophy in England and America not long after its collapse in Germany. And the intimate relation between pragmatism and the Greek Sophists is another instructive example. Shall we, in the manner of the Germans, speak of *unser* Protagoras, or shall we count Mr. John Dewey among the Greeks?

I am intentionally indulging in these vagaries to show how slippery is the field of *Rassenlehre* and *National-Kultur*. It comes perilously near being the home of the sophist and the partisan. Unrestrained imagination masquerading as "science," what can it not prove? There is no "race" or "nation" which could not be selected as the protagonist of all nobility or all baseness. Houston Stewart Chamberlain's book (*Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*) should serve as a terrible example. As Josiah Royce remarks: "When men marshal all the resources of their science to prove that their own race-prejudices are infallible, I can feel no confidence in what they imagine to be the result of Science."² We also agree with him that "no race of men . . . can lay claim to a fixed and hereditary type of mental life such as we can now know with exactness to be unchangeable."³ There is nothing in the inherent nature of one race or nation which makes it immune from the vices or the crimes of another. In our eagerness to be different from the Germans we are in danger of becoming like them in emulating the superficial and capricious methods of their race-theorists. Let us leave it to them to inoculate philosophy with a racial or national "culture."

The issues of philosophy are too grave for facile theories. So are the issues of the war. The war is a struggle of general ideas of which there are exponents in every nation and some of which come to predominate now in this, now in that country. Racial and national conflicts themselves may be interpreted in terms of a deeper opposition. There are after all but a few fundamental problems, towards which there are but a limited number of ultimate attitudes. One such problem, of which the war of nations is only one instance, is the problem of multiplicity. And this problem is as general as it is

² Race Questions and Other American Problems. New York. 1908. P. 9.

³ Ibid. P. 47.

fundamental. It is everywhere forced upon us. We have but to open our eyes to see it reflected in a thousand shapes. Nature with its manifoldness exhibits it; the inner life with its diversity of moods, passions, and motives discloses it; the social order with its variety of institutions, forces, laws, interests, and claims bares it; the world with its many lands, races, nations, states, cultures, and creeds displays it. The world is everywhere multiple and diverse. This is the universal situation. And it is this situation which creates our significant problems, practical as well as theoretical. The problem of individual ethics is the problem of choice. In a world in which there is possible but one course of action, no moral perplexity can exist. There is a problem of social morality because there are many of us. Were there but one individual, no social questions would arise. And in a world made up of one nation only, there would be no international disputes. The problems of science have meaning because many and various and complex phenomena call for interpretation. Without a multiplicity and diversity of facts to reduce to law and order, science itself would evaporate. And philosophy — what is it but an effort to reconstruct the meaning of a world in which many antitheses and contradictions seem to prevail? The work of philosophy consists in formulating the many problems of life and of reality and in appraising the validity of opposed solutions.

Thus fundamental and universal is the problem of multiplicity. It is a problem of experience as well as one of reflection. It enters every domain of life and of reality. Were multiplicity to vanish, nothing would remain. Without its aid no problem could be articulated. It is important, therefore, to sketch the attitudes which may be assumed towards the world so essentially multiple. And in terms of these attitudes, which I wish to describe in a fashion deliberately unconventional and untechnical,

the problems of the Social Order will appear in a new light.

One attitude towards the fact of multiplicity may be called the collectionistic. As the word implies, it consists in viewing the world as a collection. The world is made up of a number of things, distinct and often antagonistic in their nature. They just happen to be together. Heterogeneous and incongruous in essence, such a world resists our efforts to unify and harmonize its colliding parts. All the tragedies of life as well as its comedies have their source in a universe whose constituent elements or forces are, in the words of William James, "multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful, and perplexed." Warfare in such a world is not only natural but inevitable. Collision is the order of the day. The inner life with its antagonistic instincts, passions, and purposes, illustrates it. Nature everywhere is a struggle of contending creatures. Life is a play of hostile forces in which the equilibrium is frequently upset. It is absurd to look for stability and fixity in a world so essentially heterogeneous. Anything may happen in a pluralistic universe. Chance often shapes the course of man's life. A petty incident may decide the fate of nations. This will affect different temperaments differently. To Thomas Hardy, to take a literary instance, the world because of its incongruities is essentially tragic. Life is subject to the irrational collision of circumstances. No man can control the convergence of facts that may bring about his ruin. But life's collisions, so intensely tragic to Hardy, are for George Meredith, as well as for Anatole France, a source of intellectual delight, zest for the "Comic Spirit." But whether tragic or comic, collectionism is a universal view, of which philosophy and literature contain various expressions.

Another and a quite different attitude is the mystic's. The mystic admits that to our unscrutinized experience

the world presents itself as a collection of heterogeneous and incongruous parts. But he questions the verdict of uncritical experience. How do we know that our universe is pluralistic? No doubt our sensory and reflective knowledge so avers. We look, and what we see are diversities; we reflect, and what we achieve are complexities. But our eyes may be blind, our reason dull. Not the universe but our vision of it may be distorted. That reality is other than our ordinary experience of it has always been the mystic's contention.

"I found Him not in world or sun
Or eagle's wing or insect's eye,
Nor through the questions men may try,
The petty cobwebs we have spun."

To an experience trained to eschew the ways of sense and of reflection, which are both deceptive, reality is revealed in its true light. It stands forth as a transcendent unity, one and whole, uncompounded and indivisible. Deeper than discord is unity, deeper than difference is identity, deeper than contrast is uniformity. Multiplicity is appearance. So reports the mystic. His argument does not here concern us. But his faith will be seen to have a bearing far from innocuous upon the social questions of the day.

Thus antithetical are the two views of multiplicity. For collectionism the real nature of the world is heterogeneity, for mysticism it is homogeneity. A third view is exhibited by romanticism. Restricted to the problem of multiplicity, romanticism seems a compound of collectionism and mysticism. At its root is a double evaluation of all things. To the romanticist everything is at once grotesque and symbolic. Everything is hideous, but everything is also a source of mysterious beauty. The worth of things resides not in their intrinsic reality but in their power to suggest hidden meanings and mystic splendors. The romanticist gazes upon the world through

disparate eyes. He at once recoils from it and clings to it. He rejects the world as an independent order, having a dignity and stability of its own, but he passionately loves it as a symbolic expression of his longing and desire. "The everlasting universe of things," so Shelley in *Mont Blanc* expresses the romantic view of multiplicity,

"The everlasting universe of things
Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves,
Now dark, now glittering, now reflecting gloom,
Now lending splendor. . . ."

This quotation is typical. All things are now dark, now glittering. Between these two extremes the romanticists constantly fluctuate. Theirs is a "double vision" of life. To Byron, in *Manfred*, the world is

"A wandering mass of shapeless flame,
A pathless comet, and a curse,
The menace of the universe;
Still rolling on with innate force,
Without a sphere, without a course,
A bright deformity on high,
The monster of the upper sky."

And yet how beautiful is the same world in another mood! "Beautiful," cries Manfred,

"How beautiful is all this visible world!
How glorious in its action and in itself!"

In this double evaluation of the world, voiced by every romantic poet, we have the key to all romanticism. From it may be derived almost all the romantic conceptions of life and of art.⁴ But of this nothing can here be said. Our concern is with the connection between the problems of the Social Order and the romanticists' "double vision." This connection we shall soon note.

Yet a fourth attitude towards multiplicity remains to be suggested. It is the classic attitude. For classicism

⁴ Cf. the writer's *Classic and Romantic Trends in Plato*, in *The Harvard Theological Review* for July, 1917. Vol. X, No. 3, pp. 215-236.

multiplicities are crude material to be fashioned into significant wholes. Discord is inevitable where there is no controlling purpose. Chaos reigns without significant organization. But the world of things is plastic. It can be moulded. Confusion may be made to submit to order. This is seen in art and in science, where inchoate masses are cozened into form and law. To bring multiplicities under form and law — this is the ideal which dominates classicism. This is the essence of classic life and art. Multiplicities and diversities seemingly opaque and stubborn yield to the genius of organization and become transformed into harmonious structures, such as works of art, well-ordered souls, well-regulated cities and States. And in such orderly structures the constituent parts do not lose their unique character. On the contrary, the whole presupposes for its very unity and harmony a variety and complexity of parts. This distinguishes classic from mystic unity. The former is compounded of multiplicity, the latter is conceived in opposition to it. Without distinct and various parts, but ordered and controlled by a central purpose or principle, there can be no whole, as classicism views it. This is exemplified in Plato's well-ordered State, as well as in Greek tragedy or sculpture. The essence of personality, as taught by both Plato and Aristotle, consists in such organic union. And, despite the mystic and romantic tendencies in Plato, the Greek's universe is a cosmos. "Philosophers tell us," says Plato in the *Gorgias*, "that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and the universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule." In the classic notion of a whole composed of various yet interdependent parts, equality and difference are singularly combined. The different parts are equally constitutive of the whole. Equality does not mean mystic homogeneity, nor is

difference the same as incongruity. Save for the equal coöperation of the different parts there would be no whole; and the parts achieve individuality and significance only by thus being coöperating members. Plato's *Republic* may again be cited as instance. But it is the structure of the whole Greek view of life, at the root of which is the notion of organic unity. The harmonious adjustment everywhere of whole and part, of unity and plurality, of equality and diversity — this is classicism.

So much for a general sketch of four possible attitudes towards multiplicity, in terms of which many types of plurality may be interpreted. The inner life of man, for instance, may be viewed as a manifold of incongruous elements, as "a heap or collection" — so Hume expressed it — "of different perceptions"; or it may be identified with a solitary uncompounded and unchanging soul, substance, spirit, monad, or self; or it may be severed, as in Goethe's *Faust* and Byron's *Manfred* and Victor Hugo's *Mahomet* and certain religious and ethical doctrines, into two discordant lives — a higher and a lower, a nobler and a baser; or it may be fashioned and woven into an ordered, balanced, and harmonious personality.

And the State, in its legal or political sense, may it not be considered in the light of these distinctions? "Deeply convinced," says Maitland in his introduction to *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, by Otto Gierke, "deeply convinced though our lawyers may be that individual men are the only 'real' and 'natural' persons, they are compelled to find some phrase which places State and Man upon one level."⁵ The history of Political Theory might well be conceived as a struggle of our four ways of viewing multiplicity. Is the State a compound of single units — "a sum of presently existing individuals bound together by the operation of their own wills"⁶ — a collection of "contract-bound men"? Is the State

⁵ *Political Theories of the Middle Age*. P. xi.

⁶ *Ibid.* P. xxiii.

an independent spirit, a sort of mystic entity, a transcendent unity, and therefore beyond good and evil? Is the State a "juristic" person, a *persona ficta*, but as such possessing "symbolic" and not "real" personality? Or is the State a group-person, with a group-will, acting as a living organism? And since "it wills and acts by the men who are its organs, as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth, and hand,"⁷ must we not attribute to it genuine personality that is subject to moral evaluation?

In these questions are bound up the momentous issues of the day. Legal and political ideas of supreme significance for the peace of the world are here forced into opposition. Is the State logically prior to Law, or is Law logically prior to the State? Is the will of the State ultimate, or is there an authority, legal or moral, which ranks superior to the will of the State? Is or is not the State capable of criminal acts? These questions cannot be answered without determining the character and the reality of the State. As a mere collection of detached individuals it is irresponsible; as a mystic being, existing as a sort of Platonic Idea, the State transcends the moral judgments which bind human individuals; as a "fictitious" or "symbolic" or "hieroglyphic" personality which is and is not an individual, the State again eludes responsibility. Truly romantic is this "double evaluation" of the group. As *persona ficta* the State has all the privileges with none of the responsibilities of a person. But if the State is neither a collective name, nor a transcendent Idea, nor a fiction or symbol, but a person in the ethical sense, or an organized individuality, as Plato conceived his Republic, then the State can sin as do individuals, and is subject to the same moral restrictions as are its individual members. "That ancient saying," remarks Maitland, ". . . which bids the body politic fear no pains in another world represents profound beliefs.

⁷ Political Theories of the Middle Age. P. xxvi.

Notwithstanding all that we may say of 'national sins' and 'the national conscience' and the like, a tacit inference is drawn from immunity (real or supposed) to impeccability, and, until they are convinced that . . . States can sin, many people will refuse to admit that a State is a thoroughly real Person with a real will."⁸ The culpability or non-culpability of the State — the burning question with regard to Germany's invasion of Belgium — stands or falls with the philosophical definition of its reality. We are here face to face with a profound issue, significant alike for metaphysics and legal and political theory. It is perhaps the most central issue of the war. Collectionism, mysticism, romanticism, and classicism in political theory have been engaged in combat. Which theory will win? The moral view of the State, the view that places State and Man upon the same level, will be in the ascendant if Germany is forced to repudiate and to reverse her official judgment that "necessity knows no law." Only then will the State emerge as an ethical individuality in Plato's sense, and in the sense of recent writers, such as Gierke and Maitland. Only on the theory that the State is an ethical "group-person" can legal and moral restrictions be placed upon it. Legal and moral responsibility of the State is thus bound up with the definition of its real nature.

To discuss the problem of the State in detail would require more learning than I possess in political or legal theory. It is here mentioned merely to suggest that the issues which centre around the State would gain in coherence and philosophic significance could they be viewed in connection with the more general problem of multiplicity. The problem of the State is essentially a problem in multiplicity. And the four attitudes towards it have their legal and political expressions.

⁸ Political Theories of the Middle Age. P. xl.

But let us pass to the vexing question of nationalism, now so much in the foreground of the world's attention, and see whether our four attitudes are applicable to it. What is nationalism? No word is today more vague and yet more potent. For things that are "national" men lay down their lives. Men die that the "nation" shall not perish. For the sake of "national" honor and "national" existence individuals repudiate their own honor and waste their own existence. In some hearts national feeling burns with a religious glow. Our age has witnessed an outburst of national emotions comparable in intensity and depth with that of the religious passions of the past. The psychologist and the historian and the economist tell us *how* all this came about. The rise and the growth of national consciousness can undoubtedly be "explained." We know that there are causes, of an economic, historical, and psychological nature. But "causes" merely confront us with the same fact in new forms. A cause of a fact is the same fact connected with another fact. It is not the explanation but the meaning of the fact we wish to grasp. What meaning, what significance, what value has nationalism? Here we face a question which admits of a variety of answers. And no light matter is here at stake. Nothing less than war or peace, anarchy or civilization, may result from the answer which men give, in terms of conviction or of action, to the question of nationalism.

I make no pretence to understand the meaning of nationalism. I am only interested in some of its logical implications. A nation immediately presents itself to our minds as a certain unity in plurality. One national spirit is supposed to bind together a multiplicity and diversity of individuals. Men and women sundered from one another by almost impassable gaps constitute a single nation. Unlike in physical and mental characteristics, unlike in personal heredity and training, unlike in

religious belief and practice, unlike in moral and intellectual ideals, unlike in purpose and in thought, yet they all possess a common nationality. Different and heterogeneous in every other respect, in nationality they are identical and homogeneous. Here indeed is the ancient problem of the One and the Many with a vengeance! And let it not be said that this is mere dialectical jargon, "vicious intellectualism," a Socratic puzzle of universal and particular, of identity and difference. Social and practical consequences of grave importance lie concealed in this puzzle. One rule of life accrues from emphasizing the individual differences of men and women, and quite another results from insisting upon their national similarities.

There are some who hold that what differentiates men is deeper than what unites them. The world is a world of individuals. And individuals are qualitatively distinct. Individuals *qua* individuals are incommensurable. To give them group-marks, to tag them with national labels, is to blot out their individual distinction. There is among men a natural and inevitable distance. To emphasize what they have in common is to do violence to their inner nature. There are many forms of this type of individualism, of which Nietzsche's is perhaps the most familiar. "The individual," says Nietzsche, "is something quite new, and capable of creating new things. He is something absolute, and all his actions are quite his own. The individual in the end has to seek the valuation of his actions in himself, because he has to give an individual meaning even to traditional words and notions."⁹ This is a typical expression. Individuality is uniqueness. Individuality is difference. The "pathos of distance" is a universal fact. No likeness of language or of other social habits and activities can obliterate it. National values, forming as they do

⁹ The Will to Power; trans. by Anthony M. Ludovici. 1900. P. 215.

the basis of a collective life and thus being inimical to individual ideals, would seem to belong to those values that demand revaluation. Zarathustra thus voices his contempt for the State: "The State, I call it, where all are poison-drinkers, the good and the bad; the State, where all lose themselves, the good and the bad; the State, where the slow suicide of all is called 'life.'" ¹⁰ "And whither shall I now ascend with my longing," asks Zarathustra. "From all mountains do I look out for fatherlands and motherlands. But a home have I found nowhere; unsettled am I in all cities, and decamping at all gates. Alien to me, and a mockery are the present-day men . . ., and exiled am I from fatherlands and motherlands. Thus do I love only my children's land, the undiscovered in the remotest sea; for it do I bid my sails search and search." ¹¹ The individualist is homeless. National values are social values, and as such to be surpassed. "Mankind! . . ." cries Nietzsche in a well-known passage entitled *We Homeless Ones*, "no, we do not love mankind! On the other hand, however, we are not nearly 'German' enough . . . to advocate nationalism and race-hatred. . . . We prefer much rather to live on mountains, apart and 'out of season,' in past or coming centuries. . . . We homeless ones are too diverse and mixed in race and descent as 'modern men.' . . . We are, in a word — and it shall be our word of honor! — good Europeans." ¹² Thus wrote the man alleged by some to be responsible for the German war! "This artificial nationalism," writes Nietzsche in another place, "is . . . dangerous . . . for it is essentially an unnatural condition. . . . It is first of all the interests of certain princely dynasties, and then of certain commercial and social classes, which impel to this nationalism; once we

¹⁰ Thus Spake Zarathustra; trans. by Thomas Common. I, XI.

¹¹ Ibid. II, XXXVI.

¹² Joyful Wisdom; trans. by Thomas Common. Sec. 377.

have recognized this fact, we should just fearlessly style ourselves good Europeans.”¹³ In a world that is a collection of diverse and mixed and heterogeneous individuals there can be no room for racial or national *units*. Artificial for Nietzsche are all racial and national boundaries. Nothing is final or unchanging in a fluent and pluralistic world. Not national but individual types contend for mastery in his collectionistic universe. In Nietzsche — the collectionistic individualist *par excellence* — we have thus a negation of nationalism. The great exemplars of mankind are human and not national or racial representatives. They owe allegiance to no particular fatherland or motherland. The ultimate abolition of national frontiers seems a natural consequence of Nietzsche’s doctrine. The Superman — the goal of all life — would be endowed with human or superhuman traits peculiar to no single race or nation.¹⁴

Extremes often meet. A view which in every respect is the very antithesis of Nietzsche’s shares his anti-nationalism. It is represented by many Socialists today. “A radical clergyman in New York City,” so Mr. John Spargo relates in his article on *Socialism and Internationalism*, “obsessed after the manner of his profession by a passion for symbolism, places all the flags of civilized nations in an iron pot over a fire and ‘melts’ them. He then pretends to draw from the pot a red flag, symbolic of international Socialism, and unfurls it to the breeze amid the cheers and plaudits of the hypnotized followers. This much-exploited ceremonial was intended to symbolize the passing of nations, and their replacement by a world-organization undisturbed by the lingual and cultural distinctions which divide the world into na-

¹³ Human, All Too Human; trans. by Helen Zimmern. Sec. 475.

¹⁴ On Nietzsche’s anti-nationalism, consult Nietzsche the Thinker, by William M. Salter, New York, 1917; Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany, by Herbert Leslie Stewart, London, 1915; and the article on Nietzsche by Havelock Ellis in Vol. IX of Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics. Ed. by J. Hastings.

tional groups.”¹⁵ Thus the “plebeian herd” vie with the “masters of the world” in renouncing national allegiance. It is rather ironical that Nietzsche’s Herren and Sklaven should share at least one ideal. Zarathustra is homeless. And Nietzsche himself prefers to be identified with those that are *heimatlos*. Now Marx in his *Communist Manifesto* long ago declared, “*Die Arbeiter haben kein Vaterland.*” But how different are the motives of the “herd” from those of the “masters”! Nietzsche’s anti-nationalism is the expression of a collectionistic view of the world. Inequality, diversity, heterogeneity are of its very core. Change is the essence of life, militant individualism its moral law. Only thus can arise new and more powerful exemplars of mankind. A militant mysticism, on the other hand, seems to lie at the root of anti-national socialism. Its aim is equality. Its ideal is homogeneity. Its purpose is uniformity. “Marx argued with force,” to quote Mr. Spargo once more, “that the development of international industry and commerce tends ever to bring about identity of industrial processes and consequently ‘uniformity in modes of life.’ This, he prophesied, would lead inevitably to the disappearance of national peculiarities and contrasts, of national feeling and patriotism.” Just as the philosophic and religious mystic aims to reduce our pluralistic universe to an identity of substance, to a unity undisturbed by difference or distinction, to a uniformity untroubled by competing and changing elements, so the industrial mystic, if I may so call the revolutionary socialist, seeks after a social substance that is identical, homogeneous, and uniform. From such a social substance all distinction of rank and caste must be eliminated, all discrimination of classes removed, the contrast of capital and labor abolished. All inequalities — political, economic, social, religious, racial, national — must be

¹⁵ Atlantic Monthly for September, 1917. Pp. 300-312.

forever eradicated. Far deeper than the multiplicity, diversity, and variety of human types and classes and groups is human solidarity. Human solidarity — this is the passionate ideal which dominates the “class-conscious” worker. But it is an ideal whose fulfilment depends upon the extinction of the other classes. Relentless class-struggle is therefore an inevitable condition.

“C’est la lutte finale!
Marchons tous, et demain
L’Internationale
Sera le genre humain!”

The class-war has the significance of a holy war. It is viewed as a struggle between Humanity and its enemies. But *one* class truly represents “the people.” Not until the men and the groups that are not “the people” are crushed, not until the levelling of classes is accomplished, will peace reign on earth. Class differences are inimical to human solidarity and must be ruthlessly abolished. And here we see once more the analogy between the proletarian and the philosophic mystic, not only in the result but in the method of obtaining it. The speculative mystic institutes a reign of terror in his inner life. To his goal leads a “negative way.” Before the One Reality can become revealed to the unique and luminous vision of the mystic, the cognitive impediments of sense and of reason must first be removed. There can be no peace with one or the other dominating. Sense and reason which corrupt and debase reality must be pitilessly extirpated. But this reign of terror will be followed by the peace that passeth understanding. All strife will give way to perfect stillness and harmony. Nirvana will open its portals. All will be well. And so with the proletarian mystic. The One Social Substance cannot be compounded of its present elements. The ideal of human solidarity requires a purgative process. The

regeneration of society demands its complete revolution. No compromise with the enemy! Capitalism must be exterminated. The bourgeoisie must be abolished. "Vested interests" and the parties and the factions and the policies representing them must be uprooted. But all this is the "negative way" of the Proletarian Revolution. All this is preliminary to the final stage of social perfection, of universal *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. Thus, through a *via negativa*, shall we enter the social Nirvana. And no flippancy is intended in noting the analogy between the function of the mystic syllable *Om* and that of the guillotine of the Social Revolution. They both serve to suppress the revolt of sense and of reason.

The two types of anti-nationalism here suggested are to be interpreted as ideals in terms of which the present corrupt social order is to be reformed. They involve endless warfare. Being radical and revolutionary, they demand a complete revision of the established values, and in my mind they are correlated with philosophic collectionism and mysticism. But two different views of nationalism may now be distinguished on the basis of the romantic and the classic interpretations of multiplicity. At the root of romanticism I find a double standard of values. From one point of view things are symbolic or representative of a higher order; from another they are grotesque or sordid or corrupt. The oscillation between the symbolic and the grotesque, between the superior and the inferior, I regard as the very *differentia* of romanticism. Applied to nationalism we find it exemplified when, as some one has well said, "the members of each nation believe their national civilization to be Civilization."¹⁶ Thus the exclusive nationalism of one's own country is regarded as spiritual and ennobling, that of the foreigner narrow and selfish. Difference in national

¹⁶Quoted by E. Barker in *Political Thought in England*, Home Univ. Lib. P. 22.

civilization or culture is interpreted in terms of inequality. One's own national culture is regarded as different because of its inherent superiority. There is but one true civilization, one genuine culture, and *one* nation most perfectly embodies it. This is the voice of Chauvinism. And it is Chauvinism which leads one to a double or romantic evaluation of the same national ambitions or purposes. The commercial enterprises of the foreign nation, for instance, are the adventures of "shop-keepers"; those of one's own are expressive of an ideal mission, of a deep desire to save mankind through a superior efficiency and organization. From the German point of view the British merchants are predatory exploiters; the Germans are the knights-errant of *Kultur*.

While no country is immune from this romantic nationalism or Chauvinism, while it has its prophets and poets in France and in England and in the United States, it seems to have taken root more deeply in modern Germany than in any other land. The romantic words of her ruler are now "classic": "The trident must pass into our hands" — "We are the salt of the earth" — "The German nation alone has been called upon to defend, cultivate, and develop great ideas" — "Our German nation shall be the rock of granite on which the Almighty will finish the work of civilizing the world. Then shall be fulfilled the words of the poet: 'German character shall save the world.'"¹⁷ But these arrogant and imprudent utterances of William II are the harsh echoes of like sentiments voiced by Sybel, Giesebrecht, Treitschke, Droyesen, Häusser, and others.¹⁸ "The Prussian School of historians," says J. A. Cramb, "has written the history of Germany as the exposition of a single divine idea — the movement towards unity under

¹⁷ Quoted by J. Holland Rose in *Nationality in Modern History*. New York, 1916. P. 166.

¹⁸ Cf. *Germany and England*, by J. A. Cramb, London, 1914. Pp. 32 ff.

Prussia, not of a new empire, but of a new phase of empire.”¹⁹ But why should Germany aspire to unchallenged world-supremacy? Treitschke’s answer is a perfect expression of romantic nationalism. “What nation,” asks Treitschke, “will impose its will on the other enfeebled and decadent peoples? Will it not be Germany’s mission to ensure the peace of the world? Russia, that immense Colossus with feet of clay, will be absorbed in its domestic and economic difficulties. England, stronger in appearance than in reality, will doubtless see her colonies break loose and exhaust themselves in fruitless struggles. France, given over to internal dissensions and the strife of parties, will sink into hopeless decadence. As to Italy, she will have her work cut out to ensure a crust to her children. The future belongs to Germany, to which Austria will attach herself if she wishes to survive.”²⁰ Such is the language of Chauvinism. The day of the other nations is over. Their race is run. “Enfeebled and decadent,” they must be surpassed. It is Germany’s mission to assume control over the destinies of the world. A recent volume, *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg* (1915),²¹ contains articles by leading German scholars concerning their nation’s position as *Weltmacht*. Here we have a most unblushing exhibition of a “double standard” — the essence of romantic nationalism. Germany is depicted as standing for all that is spiritual, pure, and noble; her enemies for all that is material, gross, and selfish. I have no time for extended quotations. A few specimens must suffice. “We believe,” says no less a person than Professor Ernst Troeltsch, “that we are the people who are striving for the true and genuine progress of mankind, which does

¹⁹ Cf. *Germany and England*, by J. A. Cramb, London, 1914. P. 34.

²⁰ *Germany, France, Russia, and Islam* (Eng. Ed.). P. 17. (Quoted by J. Holland Rose in op. cit. P. 163.)

²¹ Translated by W. W. Whitelock, under the title *Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War* (New York, 1916), from which the quotations are taken.

violence to none and brings freedom to all";²² whereas on the side of Germany's enemies, "the whole situation is merely the exploitation of the Russian desire for war for the benefit of France's dream of revenge and England's longing for commercial world-supremacy."²³ "Englishmen will learn," asserts Professor Hermann Schumacher, "that there are higher forces in national life than cold-blooded desire for gain."²⁴ "The longing of the German people," so he continues, "is only to gain a freer field for the exercise of the powers given to them by God, for their own benefit as well as for the benefit of mankind. . . . Germany feels herself to be the protagonist of civilized mankind."²⁵ "We are not only fighting," avers Professor Otto Hintze, "for our own power and independence, . . . but for the freedom of all nations."²⁶ England, however, contends Professor Erich Marcks, "is fighting for a universality of power, which in reality is the narrowest and the most selfish which the modern world has seen."²⁷ Professor Friedrich Meinecke draws the contrast between his nation and its enemies thus: "We do not think nor act more harshly or more arbitrarily than others, but we do think more straightforwardly and more truthfully than the others. Here is a difference between our way of thinking and theirs."²⁸ "We are . . . the nation," concludes in all earnestness Professor Gustav von Schmoller, "capable of doing most for the advancement of international law and international arbitration."²⁹ But what of Belgium? The sublimest expression in modern history of national self-

²² The Spirit of German Kultur, in op. cit. P. 88.

²³ Ibid. P. 67.

²⁴ Germany's International Economic Position, in op. cit. P. 140.

²⁵ Ibid. P. 140.

²⁶ Meaning of the War, in op. cit. P. 622.

²⁷ England's Policy of Force, in op. cit. P. 317.

²⁸ Kultur Policy of Power and Militarism, in op. cit. P. 577.

²⁹ The Origin and Nature of German Institutions, in op. cit. P. 217.

sacrifice for an ideal elicits this from the pen of Professor Karl Hampe: "There is a strong touch of antique tragedy in Belgium's fate, for which the Belgians have to thank the perverted policy of their ruling classes."³⁰

From these remarkable essays enough quotations have been selected to show the essentially romantic spirit pervading modern Germany in her nationalism. The alien nations are inferior, unspiritual, sordid, corrupt, perverse, swayed by base motives, possessed by tyranny and lust, warring for ignoble aims; Germany alone is "the protagonist of civilized mankind," the symbol of spiritual perfection, striving for genuine progress, struggling for true independence and freedom, fighting for the supremacy of a superior civilization. The spread of Germanism — since Germanism is thus identified with all that is noble, good, and beautiful — becomes then a sacred duty. Violence and force are but means justified by the ideal end. For a "chosen" people there are higher duties than those imposed by law and morality. A nation elected to save the world must not be measured by the same standard to which "inferior" nations are bound. A "double standard" is inevitable. "Necessity knows no law" simply means the necessity of the superior nation or race in fulfilling its world-mission. "To Treitschke, as to Mazzini," says Mr. Ernest Barker, "'nation is mission'; but to Treitschke the mission of a nation is the extension of national culture, and — since power is the vehicle of culture — the extension of national power."³¹ From this point of view nationalism is essentially aggressive. Competition of national powers and national "missions" must in the end lead to friction. Friction leads to strife. Strife, such as the present, leads to an assault upon civilization by the very nations who claim to be its self-elected champions.

³⁰ Belgium and the Great Powers, in *op. cit.* P. 379.

³¹ Political Thought in England, Home Univ. Lib. P. 239.

The danger of romantic nationalism lies in the assumption that difference is inequality. Difference in national culture is interpreted as difference in kind and in value. The alien nation is different and peculiar and *therefore* on another level. Individual distinction and mental isolation from the other nation is the Chauvinist's ideal. Nietzsche's "pathos of distance" is transferred from individual persons to individual nations. In its national rather than in its individual exemplars lies, according to the Chauvinist, the goal of mankind. Civilization is identified with but one national form. It is the chosen people that has a monopoly of genuine culture. The result is a diversity of national cultures contending for mastery. Here is a new collectionism in which the antagonistic units are not individuals but nations. In a world peopled with national "souls," each conscious of its unique genius and its special mission, international rivalry and strife is a normal condition. Each nation will struggle for a dominating position. Each nation will claim a sovereign place for its superior culture. Each nation will seek to carve out its "manifest destiny." Bernhardt's *Weltmacht oder Niedergang* — world-power or ruin — would seem the only alternative for nations living in a world of competing nationalities. The history of the past with its wars and its woes is the history of national collectionism, each member more or less swayed by romantic nationalism.

The escape from national collectionism and romantic nationalism seems to lie in two opposite directions. Internationalism based upon the negation of national differences and distinctions is one alternative. The other is internationalism founded on the organization and co-ordination of national diversities. The two forms of negative internationalism already considered — that of radical individualism and that of revolutionary socialism — insisting as they do on a complete revision of the

present order, lead to endless individual or class warfare. National distinction is to be eliminated either by widening the distance between individuals or by pressing them into a uniform mould. In either case, the process is one of violence. Social pluralism inaugurates strife among individuals; social monism institutes the struggle of classes; and war remains the law of life. From this intolerable situation the ideal of organization offers itself as an escape. Disorganized groups are bound to collide as do disorganized individuals. But, like individuals, nations may be made to yield to rational organization. It is a pity that the term organization now shares with that of efficiency a certain odium. But it is absurd to condemn a principle because of the mechanical and predatory use made of it. What is needed is more rather than less organization, organization of the classic type, organization that is rational and free. An organization of free nations should do for the individual groups what a democratic and well-ordered community does for its individual members — the substitution of coöperation for aggression. The classic ideal of organization, exemplified in Plato's *Republic* but extended and applied to national units, will give rise to a new internationalism. This new internationalism will not require nations to melt, to blend, or to fuse their different characteristics. On the contrary, whatever unity or distinction, historical or psychological, national cultures may be said to possess will be preserved in a democratic society of nations. It is of the essence of democracy that difference in political, social, and religious ideas does not constitute inequality or inferiority. A whole of the classic or democratic type (I use the adjectives in this connection as synonymous) has a singular logical structure. It combines heterogeneity and equality. The heterogeneous elements of an organized whole are not mutually antagonistic, nor does their equality of action preclude difference in individual

constitution. Synthesis of diversity and unity — this is the distinguishing mark of an organization. What Kant said of an organism may be applied to any organized whole. "An organism," says Kant, "is an assemblage of active and differing parts such that each is both end and means to the whole and to every other part."

There is no time to show how Kant's definition of an organism expresses with perfect precision the classic ideal of life and of art. Nor is there time to show in detail how this ideal, applied to international organization, is at the basis of his essay on *Perpetual Peace*, in which "he proposed as the chief step towards peace a Federation of free States. They must be Republics, i.e., they must be States endowed with really representative institutions — which would rule out all forms of Bonapartism with their modern equivalent, Kaiserism. These free States would form definite compacts one with the other, thus laying the foundation for a system of International Law, binding on all, and thereby substituting the reign of right for merely national aims. Just as individuals had by degrees consented to give up something of their entire liberty so as to secure order, similarly (he urged) it ought to be possible to substitute some measure of international control for that extreme ideal of national liberty which often led to war."³² "The social relations between the various peoples of the world," observes Kant — and how accurately does his observation apply to the case of Belgium! — "in the narrower or wider circles, have now advanced everywhere so far that a violation of Right in one place of the earth is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a Cosmo-political Right of the Whole Human Race is no phantastic or overstrained mode of representing Right."³³ A state of peace, according to him, "cannot be founded or secured without

³² Summarized by J. Holland Rose in *Nationality in Modern History*. New York, 1916. P. 179.

³³ *Perpetual Peace*; trans. by W. Hastie. Pp. 103-104.

a compact of the Nations with each other. Hence there must be a . . . Pacific Federation. . . . This Federation will not aim at the acquisition of any of the political powers of a State. . . . For States viewed in relation to each other there can be only one way . . . of emerging from [the] lawless condition which contains nothing but occasions of war. . . . Reason . . . [must] drive them to give up their savage and lawless freedom, to accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and thus to form an ever-growing State of Nations, such as would at last embrace all the Nations of the earth.”³⁴ “It was a German thinker,” remarks the English historian Rose, “who in 1795 pointed towards peace, while France headed towards wider conquests — and Bonapartism.”³⁵

The internationalism of Kant — internationalism based upon the organization or federation of different but equally free peoples — has its modern champion in the President of the United States. President Wilson has in a number of his messages to Congress voiced with eloquence and force the need of international organization. Only a few passages can here be cited. On April 2, 1917, President Wilson, speaking for our nation, declared, “A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations.” In his message of December 4, 1917, he again speaks of a “partnership of nations,” which he insists must be a “partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments.” In such a partnership the different nationalities should have equal rights. This is emphasized in his letter to the Pope, August 27, 1917. Thus: “Peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments — the rights of peoples, great or small, weak or powerful — their equal rights to freedom and security and self-government.” The same

³⁴ *Perpetual Peace*; trans. by W. Hastie. Pp. 97-100.

³⁵ *Nationality in Modern History*. New York, 1916. P. 183.

idea recurs in the message of January 8, 1918: "We wish her [Germany] only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world — the new world in which we now live — instead of a place of mastery. . . . It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak." "What is at stake now," our President reiterated on February 11, 1918, "is the peace of the world. What we are striving for, is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice, no mere peace of shreds and patches. . . . Without that new order the world will be without peace, and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development." The similarity of these utterances with those of Kant is too obvious to require comment. Both President Wilson and Kant aim at a "perpetual peace," and both point to the same method of bringing it about. Here then is an escape from national collectionism and romantic nationalism. It lies in the creation of a "new international order," in the formation on equal terms of a "league," a "partnership," a "concert," of different democratic peoples. It is Josiah Royce's conception of the Great Community translated in terms of constructive statesmanship. And this Great Community will henceforth be the champion of our common civilization. Civilization will cease to be the monopoly of single and "chosen" nations. It will become the united effort of organized humanity, the common fruit of a Social Order that is a World-Order.

Is this a mere ideal? It is, if by ideal is meant a goal still distant to which our personal and national activities should be directed. It may be very difficult to attain. But in this sense all other modes of changing the present order are ideals and difficult to attain. Militant individualism is an ideal; the supermen who shall inherit

the earth are not yet in sight. The Nirvana of the Proletarian Revolution is an ideal; the capitalists and the bourgeois are still at large. Riotous and romantic nationalism is an ideal; there still are strong and self-conscious nations unsubdued. The ideal of a society of nations is no more than the other ideals difficult of attainment. And it commends itself because it seeks to substitute peace for the sword, coöperation for violence, civilization for barbarism.

The present struggle is to my mind a struggle of the four ideals which this Essay has endeavored to suggest. One may not connect them as I do with the general attitudes towards the problem of multiplicity. He may prefer to describe them in more conventional ways. But the ideals themselves — name them what you will — one cannot fail to recognize. Individualism, militant or pacific, has everywhere its vociferous or sullen representatives; Revolutionary Socialism is now asserting itself with grim determination; Lawless Nationalism is still undefeated. But among the Allied Peoples, now intimately united for the defense of civilization, a new ideal makes itself heard with increasing definiteness, the ideal of an organized humanity, of an international community. Which ideal will prevail? No one can foretell. But the President has spoken for our nation. We are fighting that the ideal of a new international order *shall* prevail.

THE SEMINARY OF TOMORROW

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

It may be objected to our title that it begs the most important question at issue. Who knows whether tomorrow there will be any seminary? In the stern competition that is before us no institution can hope to survive which does not prove itself indispensable. What right have we to assume that the seminary will be found in this class?

This leads to a more fundamental question still, namely, the question of the future of the church. The seminary exists to train ministers. Its future is therefore wrapped up in the future of the church that it serves. The question whether the seminary is to continue to hold its central place in our educational system is the question whether the church is to continue to hold its central place in the life of mankind. To answer this question we must take one step further and raise the question of the future of religion. Is religion in the future, as in the past, to prove itself one of the major interests of mankind, something which deserves the central place in time, in thought, in money, in personal consecration and sacrifice, which it has held in the past? If it is, then the church will continue and with the church the seminary, for the church is simply the application to the field of religion of the principles of organization which are involved in the nature of society itself.

I think we are safe in taking it for granted that whatever else we may succeed in dispensing with in the period of reconstruction after the war, it will not be religion.

In this time of crisis, as so often in the past, religion has demonstrated again its perennial vitality. We see that it is not something imposed upon man from without as a result of precept and doctrine, whether human or divine, but is rooted in the nature of man himself. Religion is the cry of the heart for some firm basis for faith in a world where all things are shaking. If there is any one thing which the war may be said to have proved, it is this.

Religion then, we may take it for granted, will last, and with religion its institutions, the church and the seminary. But will this religion still be Christianity, understanding by this word the religion of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ? In the new world which will face us after the war can we still make a case for the principles of him who has taught us to believe that God is love, that He saves by sacrifice, that His purpose is brotherhood, that the law of His Kingdom is ministry?

Whether this will be so or not will depend in no small part upon the seminary of tomorrow. It will depend upon what we who are teachers teach about the religion we call Christianity, and how we teach it.

There was a time not so many years ago when the lot of a teacher, at least in this country, was not an enviable one. In the competition of the professions he seemed to have been left behind. The great rewards went to other callings — the law, business, engineering, commerce. Teaching — and in this I include the ministry — was regarded as an easy job, something that might be turned over to the men who were not robust enough to fight their way to the front in the real battle of life. The scientist indeed, especially in the field of the physical sciences, was respected because he could do things that were practical, like inventing wireless, or devising aëroplanes and submarines. But today we are not so sure that science pure and simple is so beneficent a thing as

we had once supposed. We have learned that power alone is morally neutral, and the greater it is, the more harm it will do unless it is guided aright.

And so we are coming to a new understanding of the significance of the teacher's work. What is it that explains the gigantic power of the Germans in the war? How comes it that their people have been so united in support of a cause that seems to us so abominable? It is because of the character of the teaching which they have had. For a generation their minds have been shaped to this very end, and all the resources of university and school and church have been bent to the one task of making loyalty to the State appear the supreme virtue. It is not the armies of Germany alone that we have been fighting, but her philosophy, and it is with philosophy that the teacher has to do.

If then we are to gain the complete victory we desire, it will not be enough to have defeated the armies of Germany in the field. We must conquer her philosophy. We must show that the ideal in which we believe and for which we have been fighting is rooted more deeply in human nature, makes an appeal more profound and satisfying to human need, and offers a broader scope to human aspiration than its rival. We must not stop with *saying* that democracy is a better form of social organization than autocracy. We must show wherein and for what reason this is true.

This gives the seminary its unique opportunity. For the seminary is the teacher of teachers. In its classrooms are to be formed the ideals which must inspire the leaders of the next generation, as they go out to interpret the Christian Gospel to the men and women who must live their lives under the new conditions which are now confronting us after the war.

If we take our present system of ministerial training as a whole we find that there are two main evils from

which it suffers. The first is denominationalism, and the second, intellectualism. By denominationalism I mean the spirit which identifies Christianity with the form of religion represented in one's own communion. It must be confessed that this spirit has in the past dominated the teaching of far too many seminaries. The student is indeed reminded of the existence of other branches of the Christian church and given some information as to their history, but his teacher makes little effort to interpret their significance as they appear to those who look at them from the inside. They are presented as erroneous or, at most, inadequate forms of Christianity which it is sufficient to treat as the Levite treated the man who had fallen among thieves. We may bow to them and pass by on the other side.

By intellectualism I mean the disposition to think of Christianity primarily as a series of beliefs, or at least of practices and experiences which follow upon the acceptance of such beliefs. We have been accustomed to think of Christianity as a deposit of doctrine which has come down to us from the past, and must be transmitted to the future unchanged, rather than as a living spiritual movement which is to be judged by its effects upon the life of its adherents as a whole. In both these respects the seminary reflects the church at large. People think of a denomination as a group of men banded together to propagate a type of belief, and this conception of the function of a denomination is one of the chief reasons which explains the failure of the church to command the whole-hearted allegiance of many thoughtful men.

It is not my purpose here to criticize denominational Christianity. As good Protestants we may believe that in the providence of God each of the great historic churches has fulfilled a necessary function and is the custodian today of precious and indispensable truth. One may believe that he is the best Christian, in the

broad and catholic understanding of Christianity, who is most familiar with and who most highly values those historic forms in which the universal gospel has been brought to him in his own inner life. But such sympathetic understanding of historic Christianity is quite a different thing from denominationalism in the sense in which we are speaking about it now. By denominationalism in this sense is meant a narrow view of life, a view that is content to think of God and of Jesus Christ in those particular forms and ways of working that are nearest and most congenial to the individual Christian, and to ignore those wider activities and interests which are dear to other Christians. Denominationalism in this sense is by no means confined to conservatives. There is a narrowness of liberalism which differs little, if at all, from the narrowness of the most reactionary conservative. It is no uncommon thing to find students, and for that matter, teachers, who, having gained a new conception of the Bible as the result of modern critical studies, have henceforth little interest in or respect for men who have found their way to Christ by the older ways; men who believe that in the interest of some vague thing which they call modern thought or the scientific spirit, they can throw overboard the historic forms of the past and set up some brand new form of Christianity of their own in their place. Such an attitude is twin brother to the denominational spirit and, like it, is a foe against which we must contend in the interests of the seminary of tomorrow.

This narrow conception of the function of the teacher of religion has its roots in an intellectualistic philosophy, a philosophy which identifies religion primarily with belief. Here too I would not be misunderstood. As good Protestants we must recognize that belief has a most important part to play in religion. It makes a difference what a man thinks about God; but belief, even in this

highest of spheres, is after all not primary but secondary. God and Christ, sin and salvation, the church and the Kingdom of God, are realities which we come to know by living, that is to say, through sentiment and action and all those many-sided vital processes which we sum up together under the name of experience. And just as men differ in their theories of the State and of the school who may yet share the common life of citizens and engage together in the quest of knowledge, so there is a bond of union between Christians which persists in spite of their differing philosophies. This fact has been too little recognized in our theological teaching and has not had the formative influence which it should have in shaping our curriculum.

As a result we see a reaction against current methods of seminary instruction which takes two different forms. One is a reëmphasis upon feeling in religion. We see this in great revival movements like the Billy Sunday campaign. Here men are brought together under conditions which appeal primarily to the emotions, and the function of the teacher in religion is reduced to a minimum. The other reaction is in the direction of practice, and may be typified by the Young Men's Christian Association. In the Young Men's Christian Association, as it is functioning today in the army, we see a practical agency of the highest efficiency, bringing together men of very different antecedents and varieties of training, and combining them in various helpful practical activities of social and moral character. All this is done in the name of religion, and no one who has followed the work of the Association closely can fail to rejoice in the beneficent influence it is exerting. But when we study the type of religion which is presented in the Association-program, we find that it is often one-sided and inadequate. The church as an institution is not made prominent. The differences of conviction which divide the different Chris-

tian communions are ignored, and the appeal is made to a practical religion of fellowship and helpfulness, which, so far as it goes, is admirable, but which lacks the theoretical foundation which is necessary to a healthy and robust intellectual life.

We face, then, two alternatives, neither of which holds out large promise for the future. On the one hand, we may perpetuate the old denominational intellectualistic type of religious instruction; on the other, we may substitute a vague inarticulate Christianity of sentiment or of practical expediency, which has lost its consciousness of the historic past from which it has come. Neither of these offers us a hopeful outlook. Between the two there must be some other and better way.

We may take as our point of departure three propositions, which I think we may safely assume to have been demonstrated by the experience of the last three years. They are not new. We had already come to recognize them to a very considerable extent, but the war has brought them clearly into the foreground of consciousness. First, the religion of the future must be to a greater extent than it has been in the past a religion for the whole man, a religion, that is to say, which takes into account not simply what a man believes but what he feels and what he does. We have been learning to our surprise — shall I say, to our dismay? — how large a part sentiment plays in the determination of conduct. We are the creatures of our likes and of our dislikes. Our sense of honor and our sense of pride, our sense of loyalty and our revulsion against what we conceive to be mean, all that side of our nature which expresses itself in feelings of satisfaction or of disapproval, we now see to be a potent factor in determining what we shall do. We must apply this insight to religion. We must think of religion as man's emotional reaction to the great unseen realities by which he is surrounded, the response of his spirit to

deep-seated needs rooted in his very nature. We must not confine religion to that part of it which is precipitated in our formal creeds or expressed in our definite acts of worship. We must widen and deepen the foundation on which we build for the future.

Secondly, within this common realm of experience we note differences of type which persist. The difference between Roman Catholic and Protestant springs at once to mind. In the past we have thought of this too largely in terms of right and wrong belief. We have contrasted Protestantism with its emphasis upon Bible texts with Catholicism as the religion which has substituted for this human traditions; and there is truth in this contrast, no doubt. But we are coming to see that it is not the whole truth. In Catholic and Protestant we have to do with different types of the religious life itself. Catholic religious experience is in general of the mystical type; Protestant religious experience, of the ethical type. This is a contrast which is not confined to Christianity but is found in other religions as well, and is likely to persist as long as religion lasts because it is rooted in human nature. So within Protestantism we find other persisting types. There is the extreme individualist, who insists upon the right of the soul to direct access to God and feels the intrusion of any intermediary a disturbing factor; and there is the man of artistic temperament, to whom form and ritual and sacrament are the natural means of approach to the Divine. There is the man who emphasizes the permanent element in religion and rejoices in the stability which it brings; and there is the one who, like Professor Hocking, thinks of religion as essentially creative and values it because it is continually bringing new things to pass. We cannot expect that any one of these types will completely supersede the other. Somehow the religion of the future must make place for them all.

But, thirdly, side by side with this recognition of difference we find a great longing for unity, a feeling that somehow Christianity is a larger and more comprehensive thing than our own cross-section of it, however dear to us that may be. We find men of all schools and of all churches feeling after something better and bigger and more enduring than anything that they have known in the past, and we are sure that somehow the religion of the future must give us this.

This situation sets the seminary of tomorrow its task. We must teach Christianity and our own particular form of it to men who are living in a world like this, with longings and aspirations and desires and convictions such as these.

This does not mean that we are to surrender our own convictions. It does not mean that we are to teach an indefinite, inarticulate, formless religion. Quite the contrary. It is our function to make our religion definite, to provide the solid basis of thought that shall direct our sentiments to useful ends and cause them to issue in fruitful acts. But our thinking must be done in the light of this larger environment and with a spirit of sympathy broader and more inclusive than has characterized much of our teaching in the past.

This conviction will determine our attitude toward the other great religions which dispute the field with Christianity. As Christians it will be our first business to define what is the distinctive thing that Christianity has to offer them; but we shall think of them not as mere perversions, areas of black on a map otherwise pure white, but as ways in which the religious nature of man has been feeling its way after the truth. We shall present Christ as the answer to their needs, supplying that which they lack, correcting their defects, opening for them possibilities of new development along lines for which their own past has fitted them, as our past has

been fitting us for new experiences and development of our own.

It will affect our attitude toward the varieties of the Christian experience. We shall not try to make all men agree with us, but we shall try to carry the spirit of Christ into our own living and thinking to such an extent that we shall be able to recognize that spirit when it manifests itself in men of a different type. We shall eagerly reach across the barriers which now divide us to find some common bond of unity, and we shall find that bond where all true Christians must find it, in the person and the work and the spirit of Jesus Christ.

So in like manner of those more technical differences which divide us into schools. We shall not be less zealous to promote our own type of philosophy. We shall wish to help others to the explanation and interpretation of the Christian facts which we have found most helpful to ourselves, but we shall be careful to distinguish between the interpretation and the facts. We shall be quick to recognize that those who do not agree with our theory may yet share our experience and work with us for the great end we have in common.

In the light of such considerations we must approach the problem of the seminary curriculum. More even than it has been in the past the seminary of the future must be a training school for ministers, men, that is to say, who have given themselves to a definite task. All that we do must be shaped to this end. No study must be admitted to the curriculum, no matter how attractive it may be, that cannot be shown to have some direct bearing on the minister's task. And conversely, no study must be omitted from the curriculum, however great the tax it may make on time and energy, which can be shown to be necessary for ministerial efficiency.

Next, we must train men for a specialized ministry. If a man is going to be a minister of a particular denomina-

tion, he ought to know the conditions of successful service in that denomination. He ought to know the history of his church, its organization, its missionary activities, and whatever else goes to make up the life of the denomination as a whole. The Presbyterian must know the history of Presbyterianism, the Methodist of Methodism, the Episcopalian of his own communion, and so on. Again, the minister must be trained for the special field in which he is going to work. If he is to work in a country parish, he must have one kind of training; if his work is to be among immigrants, he will need another. If his field is a pastorate in an industrial community, or if he is specializing in religious education, or if he plans to be a foreign missionary, in each case we must see that he knows the things that are essential to success in that field.

But with all our interest in this specialized training we must be careful never to lose sight of the things we have in common. At the core of all the separate studies of the curriculum there is a body of common knowledge which every minister must possess. It is the knowledge of the Christian religion. What does it mean to be a Christian? Who and what is the God whom Christians worship? Wherein consists the Christian revelation? What shall we think of Christ, of the sin from which he came to deliver us, of the salvation he mediates, of the life to which we look forward here and hereafter? What is the church of which we are ministers, not in the narrow denominational meaning of that term, as Baptist or Presbyterian, but in its unity as the Church of Christ, of which these lesser branches are parts? What is the place which each holds in the unity of Christ's body, and how can we who minister in any one of the parts coöperate most effectively with our brothers who serve in the others? These and such as these are the questions which those of us must face who are working out the curriculum for the seminary of tomorrow.

For one thing this will mean that Systematic Theology will recover again its central place in the organism of theological study. But it will be taught in a different way. It will become the study which defines the nature of the gospel for a world that is seeking unity through variety. That old discipline that used to be called Symbolics, whose function it was to compare the creeds of the different churches, will be taken down from the shelf and revived in a new form. In the seminary of tomorrow it will be just as much the business of the Baptist to know what Presbyterians and Episcopalians—I will not say *believe*, but *value and revere*, as it will be for him to know the history and traditions of his own communion. So history will be studied not simply from the past forward, but from the present back. We shall ask ourselves what history can tell us as to the origin and significance of the chief contemporary forms of the living religion with which we have to do. And the Bible will become a new study as we think of it not simply as the record of God's revelation in the past given once for all, but as the source of a continuing inspiration through which from generation to generation Christians have renewed their contact with the divine, and in which men of different types of Christian experience have alike found food for their souls. Thus in all our study the practical purpose of gaining sympathetic understanding with our fellow Christians for the purpose of effective coöperation will be dominant, and many a subject which in the past has seemed trite and profitless because devoid of practical bearing, will come at last to its own.

So to conceive of theological education is not to lower our intellectual standards. There is in many quarters a false opposition between science and practice, as though a man knew things better the farther removed he was from the sphere of their application. This is a view for which experience affords no justification. On

the contrary, we shall find that the practical interest, if properly guided and controlled, will bear large fruit for science in research and its resulting theory.

Of the application of these principles in detail this is not the place to speak. It will, of course, be necessary to distinguish between different types of institutions to which the problem presents itself in different ways. The seminary at a distance from a great university, teaching a constituency of students most if not all of whom are going into a single church, will necessarily solve its problem differently from an institution in close affiliation with a great university, to which students of many communions come for their theological training. But in spite of these differences, the task is essentially the same, and it should be possible to work out a plan of coöperation between seminaries that will enable each group to coöperate helpfully with the others.

What has been said about the ideal of seminary instruction applies in substance to the work of the church as a whole. Protestantism has always stood for the teaching function of the minister. Its strength consists in the fact that it trusts the layman to form his own judgment in matters of religion and refuses to regard the ministry as a separate and isolated caste. But this means that Protestantism stands or falls with its ability to instruct the people at large in the meaning of the religion they profess. For this reason one of the most disturbing symptoms of the last generation has been the decline of the teaching office of the minister. It is not too much to say that in very large measure Protestantism has surrendered to Roman Catholicism that very function to which it owes its own existence. It is not the Protestant but the Catholic who is today teaching the layman the meaning of the religion which he professes. Go into the larger Catholic churches today and you will find for sale at the door little tracts which explain, in simple language

that the layman can understand, the meaning of the church and its institutions. But a man might attend many a Protestant church for years and remain as ignorant of what Protestantism means as when he first found his way to the church door. The war with its resulting revelation of our disunion has recalled us to the perils of this situation. We must see to it that in the future the laymen of our churches are better instructed. As Protestants we stand for the rights of the individual in religion. We have rejected an implicit faith; we believe that each man must stand on his own feet in the presence of God and be able to give an intelligent reason for his belief. This fundamental tenet of our Protestantism we must restore to the central place from which it has been for the time dethroned.

It will not be easy to do. Let us not deceive ourselves on this point. To build a unified church on the basis of autocracy is not hard. It has been done again and again. To build a unified church on the basis of freedom requires a degree of intelligence and discipline to which as yet few of our churches have attained. It is the same problem which faces us in religion as in democracy itself. How can we who accept the principle of free determination as the supreme law of the State succeed in uniting men of different races and ideals in a single community of free peoples? Somehow it must be done unless all our struggle and sacrifice is to be in vain. But we shall not succeed in doing it in the State unless we succeed in doing it in the church, and to show how this can be done will be the supreme office of the seminary of tomorrow.

THE CAUSES OF PRE-MILLENARIANISM

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The spread of pre-millennial and kindred views — by which we mean the scriptural thousand years of peace following the more or less early return of Christ in physical manifestation — is an unmistakable fact of present-day religious thinking. Some of the causes of the pre-millennial revival are incidental and can be dismissed in a word. For example, some pre-millenarianism is the after-effect of the powerful personality of Dwight L. Moody. Mr. Moody was one of the greatest personal forces for righteousness of his time; and some of the movements which resulted from his influence — like the Student Volunteer Movement — were at their beginning considerably colored by the Moody theology. Again, as a plain matter-of-fact, pre-millenarianism has made an appeal to not a few rich men who have given their money to carefully planned propaganda. Furthermore the Great War has raised in many minds the question as to whether the world is not indeed standing at Armageddon. The writer of this article found in France in the winter of 1917-18 a considerable group of American soldiers who had been led to study the Book of Revelation for light on the question as to when the war would end — many of the soldiers, be it said, fearing that it was written down in the Sacred Book that the war would end in February, 1918, before America could have her full chance.

But there are other and more serious grounds for pre-millenarianism. It is clear that we can adequately deal

with a religious phenomenon only by learning its causes. The biblical scholar answers the pre-millennial reasonings with crushing argument, but the pre-millennial view lives on. In fact, it has been with the Church from the beginning. More can be accomplished by asking why it exists and what it aims at and what are the secrets of its power than by any number of critical demolitions. A view which has to be demolished so often becomes something of a problem in the study of theological survivals.

The most obvious reason for the tenacity of pre-millennial views is, of course, the literalistic method of interpreting the Scriptures, or of taking the thought forms of one age as binding for all ages. The fault here is very largely with Christian teachers who may not think of themselves as at all literalistic. In spite of the fact that most of the trained men in the pulpits of the Church today accept the principles and methods of scientific Bible study, many of them make no application of these principles in their preaching. The preaching is pre-eminently practical rather than theological or even biblical. The Church for centuries has taken at least a partially literal view of the Book of Revelation — especially as regards a physical second coming of Christ. The working preacher has accepted the commonplaces of scientific biblical study — the documentary hypothesis as explaining the origin of various scriptural books, the rearrangement of scriptural dates which has come with more exact historical research, the theory of the synoptic problem. But busy as he is with swarms of details in his church-work he has never tried to get at the spiritual content of the various biblical apocalyptic conceptions. The actual result is that in the mind of his people — and sometimes in his own mind — these linger along with at least a semi-literalistic suggestiveness. At the other extreme is the minister who throws himself so heartily

into eschatological study that he makes even the thought of Jesus so eschatological as to leave Jesus no message of abiding and perennial worth. Apart from the deliverances of extremists, however, the biblical eschatology — especially of Jesus — should in these days be made the subject of the study of the working preacher; not to encounter present-day pre-millenarianism with critical refutations but to discover the spiritual content at which the pre-millenarian may be half-consciously aiming. To condemn the pre-millenarian movement as the activity of literally minded fanatics gets us nowhere. The only path to successful dealing with the movement is to show that the scientific handling of the Scriptures can preserve and even make more forceful the spiritual ideals at which Scripture apocalyptic aims.

There is nothing in the most rigid orthodoxy to forbid the recognition of eschatological factors in the thought of Jesus. Any Christological theory must make provision for the truth that Jesus lived the life of his time, and used the ideas of his day to set on high his revelation. The only real question of debate is as to the extent to which Jesus spoke in eschatological terms. Very few would today go as far as Schweitzer in *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* and make the thought of Jesus eschatological and nothing else. Schweitzer—who, by the way, is not a German but an Alsatian and not a scholastic recluse but a devoted medical missionary — says himself that the only way to make a theory effective is to push it to its extreme development; and Schweitzer's work appears as if it had been carried through on this principle. The best balanced thought of today seems to incline to the view that the eschatological element in the Gospels is not at all exclusive or even determinative, but that on the other hand it is not to be cast aside as mere husk of a passing phase of Jewish thought. It contains in itself some features of lasting value.

To begin with, it is hardly fair to charge millennial views with being pessimistic. More than once the pre-millennialists' doctrine that the sooner things get hopelessly bad the sooner Christ will come, has been caricatured in the jibe, "The world is getting worse, thank the Lord!" And sometimes it does seem as if the holder of these views were willing to keep his hands off so that things might speedily get worse. But with regard to the mass of believers in the Lord's speedy coming in the flesh this is only caricature. Logically if things must get worse before they can be better, the correct attitude might be just to permit them to get worse. Practically, the pre-millennialist is a human being, quite as warm in his human contacts as the rest of us, and quite as likely to help a fellow human being in distress. One of the fiercest opponents of social service in America — an opponent because he believes that social service delays the quick consummation of evil which will make necessary our Lord's return — is himself a most successful superintendent of an organization of orphanages! But, logical inconsistency to one side, a pre-millennialist whose views are to be taken at all seriously cannot be called a pessimist. All the holders of biblical apocalyptic views have been alike in their belief in a good time coming. So great has been the practical effectiveness of this optimism that Dr. A. B. Davidson used to say that the great preachers from biblical times down to our day have been men of great expectations. Now there must be unremitting emphasis upon the futility of tying great expectations up with the details of Jewish or early church apocalyptic, but there must also be some way of holding fast the expectations. A scholar whose exegetical studies have dried up all his enthusiasms is not the best agent to counteract the fallacies in the pre-millennialist's new order just below the horizon. It will hardly suffice to lay stress on belief in the immediate, spiritual Christ as

contrasted with Christ-to-come, if the belief in the immediate Christ opens up no fountains of enthusiasm. It is an interesting fact that the non-millennialists who get along best with the most earnest pre-millenarians are those of manifestly intense religious experience. One religious leader of considerable prominence has succeeded beyond belief in winning the support of the most radical pre-millennialists, even though his avowed belief is itself radically against the belief of his friends. The secret is the leader's obviously genuine and enthusiastic devotion to the spirit of Christ. K

Holders of apocalyptic views in all periods of the life of the Church have been believers in "other-worldliness." They have been profoundly dissatisfied with the earthly system of things. They have been able to see no way of remedy except by the total substitution of the present system by another through direct act of God himself. Their "other world" has not so much been a far-off heaven as a transformation of the present physical system. This view of the desperate nature of the existing system is greatly reënforced in times of widespread calamity or war. Now the advantage of the pre-millennialist comes partly out of his facing the facts of the present system. His optimism is the optimism of belief in a God mighty to deliver. There is, on the other hand, a good deal of optimism in the non-millennial camp that is hopelessly shallow. It consists just in looking the other way when the problem of evil is up. Suppose we glance at this question from the physical side. There is probably in every Christian's eschatology a belief that in the final consummation of things an ideal physical state will be the accompaniment of and setting for an ideal spiritual condition. The present physical state is far from ideal. All we can say of it is that it is capable of immense improvement but that improvement is within limits. Masses of mankind give themselves up to fatal-

ism because they feel the futility of trying to deal with the more elemental physical forces. While the improvement is being made, individuals die by the hundred thousand. The whole trend of the physical universe as we see it is toward ultimate dissolution. The doctrine of the divine immanence does not help us much if the divine is limited to the outworking of the present forces. In fact a doctrine of divine immanence which puts God in all things without giving us an adequate basis for trust in Him may make the cosmical situation more depressing. The sincere pre-millennialist has a solution for all this, no matter how crassly literalistic it may seem to us. The only way to meet the pre-millennialist is not merely to preach the vast change for the better which can be made in the present order of things but to emphasize anew the Christian conception that the Divine Force is not shut in to the workings of the present system. There is a sense in which the Church would benefit by a return to emphasis on the transcendence of God — transcendence conceived not indeed in the old sense of distance from and exaltation above earthly affairs, but transcendence thought of as existence beyond the limitations set by the forces which we see at work. As an illustration a little beside the mark, think of the new interest in and demand for belief in immortality created by the Great War. Men will not believe that this life is all, as they see the very flower of the youth of earth hurled to death by the million through devotion to a noble cause. So the non-millennialist will have to hold fast to an order above this or beyond it or here though invisible, if he is to deal with the problem with which the millennial views are trying to deal. But there is a vast difference between a view which would practically call for catastrophic annihilation of the present order and the substitution of another order, and a view which maintains that the seen does not exhaust the real, that

an enlarging grasp of reality might put the present system into its proper place as but one factor of divine activity. There can be no question that the practical ignoring of larger reaches of the divine power and wisdom and love by concentrating ourselves upon the immediate work-a-day task without much question as to anything beyond that task, makes for a revival of crude literalism in religious thinking.

The views against which we are contending, however, in their present-day forms concern themselves more with social than with physical conditions. Their pessimism is as to the power of man to achieve a worthy social result without the direct and miraculous power of the returning Christ. Here again the conventional church-attendant, and preacher, for that matter, is too easy-going in his optimism. The human mind has, if anything, wrought greater results in dealing with nature than with human nature. The race has gained a tolerable measure of control over famine and pestilence but has not yet learned to control itself. No form of social organization yet devised is certain of final success. We are indeed reaching out after world-democracy; but democracy rests not upon self-evident right of the people to rule but upon the fact that every other sort of government has failed. We turn to democracy as a last resort. But what if that fails? We raise this question just to suggest how much of a case can be made by those who are hopeless as to the present state of society. It is significant that the more radical type of socialists believe that the present social order can be improved only by a revolutionary overturning through a "general strike," or some such method. In their passionate enthusiasm for the immediate relief to come through sudden revolution the socialists have many points of similarity with the pre-millennialists: both bear witness to the deep-seated faults of the existing system, and both despair of slow-

moving processes of growth or evolution. Let us not make light of this despair. At the close of the most dreadful war in history, with some economists clamoring for our taking up the old industrial processes just where we dropped them, and some statesmen calling for a return to the old system of competitive and armed nationalism, it ought to be easy to understand the spirit which prompts the socialist to believe that the only hope is a revolution which will overthrow the system from below, or the pre-millennialist to cherish the hope that a divine intervention will overthrow the system from above.

One of the best checks to the spread of pre-millennarianism is an openness to the spirit of radical social reconstruction. The charge that the pre-millennialist is not interested in social reform is misleading. He is not interested simply because he has no faith in the methods proposed. For him the system is so bad that no agencies now at work can make substantial improvement. The author of this article is not by any means a socialist, but one does not have to be a socialist to see the very grave evils in the present system. The inequalities in the distribution of wealth alone bring the industrial order under most serious question. Now to confront the pre-millennialist who believes that the system is so evil that only God Himself can put it to rights and that by apocalyptic transformation, with the merely remedial program of many Christian leaders, is to trifle with the problem. Relief measures are good enough as mere relief, but the social order is in need of conversion. The Church must never allow herself to come to the place where she busies herself merely with schemes of social reorganization as such; but the Gospel is not fully preached until it produces the atmosphere out of which social transformation comes. To meet this situation by any sort of apology for the present order, or by reminding the people that by

gradual processes of evolution the world is getting better, is to play directly into the hands of the believers in the literal fulfilment of biblical apocalyptic. For the serious believer in such apocalyptic — and it is only the serious believer that we are considering — has at least faced the fact of the unideal nature of the present social order. The most far-reaching suggestion of social reconstruction now seriously before the attention of the world is the program of the British Labor party — a program which dares think of reconstruction in terms which embrace the whole world. It has been said that one element of strength in the British Labor party comes from the fact that the party has thrown open its larger assemblies and even its inner circles to the leaders of the churches in England. Be that as it may, there can be no gainsaying the increased power which will come to the churches of England from courageously facing the evils of the present industrial and international order and from determinedly proposing to try out thoroughgoing remedies. It is a matter for congratulation that the churches everywhere are beginning to see how deeply rooted are the faults of the world in which we live, and how heroic must be the measures of redemption. This is not to raise the cry of the alarmist. We are simply dealing with the problem of inadequate and distorted religious views; and we are trying to show that we must not allow such views to outdo us in seriousness of grasp on the world situation. Much of the so-called pessimism of apocalyptic views comes as a reaction from the smug complacency in the presence of social evils which sometimes passes as Christian optimism. ✓

Another feature of apocalyptic views which has always made them attractive to many devout minds has been the place which they have assigned to God as the Judge of nations. The very fact that the believers in a literal fulfilment of apocalyptic prophecy say as much as they do ✓

about God as Judge serves to keep in the forefront of religious thinking a moral and spiritual element of which we sometimes lose sight. The constant reference to law and force in abstract terms tends to make the ordinary, busy members of the Church think of the large national and international affairs as moving along in impersonal fashion. The thought of the leaders of the Church has long since clearly grasped the truth that a law is nothing in itself but a statement of method; that the God of the Scriptures can be conceived of as working in such manner that laws are but compendious descriptions of his never-ceasing deed. But the idea needs constant repetition and reënforcement. Men seldom lose their hold on the divine through sudden shock. Their faith rather wears out or oozes away because of the constant pressure of apparently impersonal and opaque facts. The very fact that the literalist says so much about God — even though he occasionally oversteps the limits of good taste in talking familiarly, not to say glibly, about the plans of God — gives him an advantage as a propagandist. He seems to be more religious than those who talk of national evils as coming naturally to judgment in their fruit. Especially is this true in a day which thinks of national and international welfare largely in utilitarian terms. The field of international ethics has never been very clearly thought through, but in that field we did not, until the outbreak of the Great War, hear much of righteousness and justice and judgment to come. The pulpit has, if anything, neglected its opportunity to emphasize and reemphasize historical processes as subject to the judgment of a moral God. The danger of cant here is very great, but there is also the other and even greater danger of encouraging impersonalism through failure to teach that national courses are manifestations of the purposes and judgments of the Divine. The days just ahead of us ought to be

quite favorable to the preaching of God as judge of the nations without resort to biblical literalism. The Great War has been in its larger outcome terribly suggestive of the inevitability of Divine Judgment, if we do not limit the judgment merely to one nation. All nations have worked under competitive and imperialistic ambitions, which have brought all to share in greater or less degree the disastrous fruit of such ambitions. It goes without saying, of course, that in dealing with the conception of God as Judge of nations the literalism of the pre-millenarian makes his work dreadfully barren. The type of mind that can regard the present world-crisis so largely from the point of view of the return of the Jews to Palestine shows at once the inadequacies of literalism. Professor F. C. Burkitt has drawn a very interesting parallel between the judgment scene in the Book of Enoch and the judgment picture in Matthew 25. The parallelism is so exact as to suggest irresistibly the dependence of Matthew upon Enoch, and yet the difference is just such as we should inevitably attribute to Jesus. The setting—the nations of the earth assembled for judgment—is the same in both passages. The difference is that Jesus has introduced the distinctively human test as the standard of judgment. It is amazing that the humanity of the test of Jesus as reported in Matthew 25 has not given the impulse to greater spiritualization of pre-millenarian views.

In still another respect the apocalyptic literalist has a tactical advantage in his preaching. He appeals to the human craving for the dramatic in his predictions of crisis after crisis. Here again the holder of the sounder view has been placed needlessly at disadvantage. Not that he need pay overmuch attention to the instinct for the dramatic, but he should pay more heed to the significance of crisis. In the actual world events do move toward a focus, they do show crossings and recrossings;

and a cross-roads in events may be just as important historically as is an actual cross-roads geographically. Nor is this out of harmony with the modern idea of evolution. In evolution events do not always move at the same rate of speed. A long, gradual process of growth may be crowned with a quick harvest-time, which explains the growth and points toward a larger future. There is no reason why a sound doctrine of the imminence of God may not be combined with a sound doctrine of the immanence of God. The pre-millennialist reaps an advantage from his belief that something may happen soon. On the other hand, the attitude of adjustment to a slow-moving process plodding along at a uniform rate begets patience indeed, but not the alert-mindedness which holds all the powers in readiness for the quick whitening of the harvest. This alertness, after all, is the true patience. In historic processes doors open — and then close; roads cross each other — or turn corners; trees of good or evil come to sudden fruitage. Happy the minister who can keep alive this reasonable sense of expectancy! Psychologically he wields an instrument with which to ward off from his people the temptations to the theatric and spectacular in literal apocalyptic. And the advantage is more than psychological. For understanding the movement of divine revelation hardly anything is more important than the illumination which may burst forth at times of crisis. Just as crisis is profoundly instructive in individual experience, so is it in the larger life of society. We keep our intellectual balance by reminding ourselves that a crisis which is not preceded by long periods of preparation is not likely to lead to deep insight; but we keep alive our sense of expectancy by remembering that a slowly working force will sooner or later rush toward a quick revelation of its inner meaning. There is no reason why the pre-millenarian should be allowed a monopoly of the interesting in his preaching.

Finally, there is something very compelling and attractive in the apocalyptic idea of Christ as ruler. It will be remembered that Schweitzer made this view of Christ as ruler one of the essential and permanent contributions of apocalyptic to the thought of the Church. Schweitzer insists that the picture of Jesus as teacher is not true to the fact of the oldest presentation. Jesus was not contemplative but active. And yet there is not after all such a great contradiction between the view of Jesus as teacher and that of Jesus as ruler. The Church has maintained from the beginning that Jesus taught not as a formal instructor but as a leader forcing men to learn the doctrine by doing the will of God.

For the rest, the picture of Christ as working with an apocalyptic plan is not without attractiveness. If in such a picture Christ loses something of amiability, he gains in force. He appears really as compelling events. The modern believer in non-resistance would have great difficulty in claiming Christ for non-resistance in the Marcan picture as interpreted by the scientific student of apocalyptic literature. In such interpretations the Christ is not a passive watcher of events. He seeks to force events. In his thought the Kingdom cannot come till the people are roused to reach forth for it. Hence the insistent call for repentance. Now it is entirely clear that the preacher can use this conception of the Christ — in so far as he is convinced of its truth — without subscribing to the literalistic claim.

It may be objected by some that this article deals with the pre-millennialist all too seriously, in face of the absurdities to which the literalists give themselves. Some critics insist that such absurdities can be met only by ridicule. But one who, like the writer, has seen pre-millennialists rushing through mission-fields in haste to visit all the towns before the imminent coming of the Lord, need not be told to what lengths literalism can lead

some minds. This article, however, is not written for fanatics, but rather for the serious mind who really feels that the advantage in spiritual content is with the literal acceptance of apocalyptic prophecy. Literalism of this sort must be resolutely set aside; but it is possible to set it aside without at the same time abandoning the essential spirit and aim of those who taught in apocalyptic terms some eternal truths about the presence of God in human history. The old seers spoke in apocalyptic terms because there were in their day no other terms to use. With the coming of a new day the literal apocalyptic was outdated, but the spiritual ideals of the apocalyptic still have compelling power. It is a mistake to ignore or underestimate spiritual factors because of the excesses or aberrations of literalistic interpreters of such factors.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN ACTS, AND THE "CITY OF GOD"

F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The idea of a Messianic kingdom pervades the whole of Acts. It is the subject of the discourse of the Risen Lord who speaks to his disciples "the things concerning the kingdom of God," and the disciples ask him if he will "restore the kingdom to Israel" in their time.¹ In the prayer of the Apostles, when they quote the words of the Second Psalm "the kings of the earth set themselves in array," they are evidently regarding these as the natural antagonists of the Christ.² When Peter preaches to Cornelius he says that Jesus of Nazareth was anointed by God and went about doing good (ἐνεργετῶν, a word applied to kings) and healing those under the rule (καταδυναστευομένων) of the devil, as though Satan were a rival prince.³ Paul declares to the Jews at Pisidian Antioch that God raised up David as king, and that Jesus "whom God raised from the dead" is the heir of the promise made to David's son, who, unlike his ancestor, "saw not corruption."⁴ Later at Thessalonica Paul was accused to the magistrates of proclaiming Jesus to be "another king" in opposition to Cæsar's decrees.⁵ When Paul alludes to his preaching to the elders of Ephesus at Miletus he calls it "preaching the kingdom of God."⁶ This is

¹ Acts 1 3, 6.

² Acts 4 25, 26.

³ Acts 10 38; cf. Lk. 22 25, οἱ ἐξουσιάζοντες αὐτῶν (sc. Gentiles) ἐνεργέται καλοῦνται. It was applied to the Ptolemies and Seleucidæ (Ptolemy VII and Antiochus VII were so called), and to other public benefactors. Deismann, *Light from the Ancient East*, p. 248 E. T.

⁴ Acts 13 37.

⁵ Acts 17 7; cf. Luke 22 3, Χριστὸν βασιλέα εἶναι.

⁶ Acts 20 25, 31.

entirely in accord with the parables in the Synoptists where Jesus compares himself to a king,⁷ and with the four narratives of the Crucifixion⁸; but in the Pauline Epistles there is no such allusion to Jesus. The words βασιλεύς and βασιλεία are applied generally to the Father.⁹ Nor does Paul as a rule compare the Christian polity to a "kingdom," but to a country, a family, a household or body.¹⁰ So far as may be judged by his silence, a Messianic king had no place in his system. Paul, it is true, alludes to Christ's Davidic descent, but only to contrast his birth "according to the flesh," with the proclamation of his divine sonship "according to the spirit of sanctification" at the resurrection.¹¹ It might be maintained that Paul resolutely preserved silence concerning a kingdom in his eschatology with which in his reported speeches Acts is not disposed to credit him. The Christology of the Pauline Epistles, earlier as well as later, transfers the rule of Jesus from earth to the sublime abode of the heavenly powers,¹² agreeing with the Johannine teaching that his kingdom is "not of this world."¹³

In early patristic literature it does not appear that the idea of Christian hope being connected with a kingdom of Jesus as Messiah appealed much to believers, whose attention was devoted to other aspects of his mission. In the letter to Diognetus and in the Syriac hymn of the

⁷ Matt. 18 23 ff., 22 7 ff.

⁸ All the accounts agree that Jesus was crucified as King of the Jews. The Fourth Gospel explains that Christ's kingdom is "not of this world;" John 18 36.

⁹ Βασιλεύς is never used as a divine title except in 1 Tim. 1 17, 6 15; βασιλεία, Rom. 14 17, 1 Cor. 4 20, Col. 4 11 (the Christian dispensation), 1 Cor. 6 9, Gal. 5 21, 1 Thess. 2 12, 2 Thess. 1 5 (the inheritance of the saints). Only in Eph. 5 5, Col. 1 13, is the kingdom connected with Christ. In 1 Cor. 15 24 Christ delivers the kingdom at the end to God, even the Father.

¹⁰ Πατριὰ, Eph. 3 15 (but see J. A. Robinson's note), πολιτενμα, Phil. 3 20, πρὸς τοῦς οὐρανοῦς τῆς πίστεως. The conception of a heavenly state is characteristic of Stoicism. See Lightfoot on Phil. 3 20; Dill, Roman Society, p. 324.

¹¹ Rom. 1 3. Contrast Lk. 1 32, "He shall sit on the throne of David his father."

¹² Col. 1 15 ff. Eph. 4 10, etc.

¹³ John 18 36.

Soul the Father is the king and the Son his delegate; but it was not till the capture of Rome by Alaric in A.D. 410 that Augustine brought into prominence the doctrine that the Church was a State established upon earth in contrast with the kingdoms of this world. To appreciate the meaning of his teaching which had so powerful an influence on subsequent Christian thought, it is necessary to review the argument of the *De Civitate Dei*, a treatise whose title is better known than its contents, which somewhat belie the suggestiveness of the name affixed to them.¹⁴ Alaric's capture of Rome in A.D. 410 was a calamity the effect of which cannot be properly estimated by its immediate consequences. Rome had for generations been merely the titular capital of the Empire, nor was its so-called sack an overwhelming catastrophe. But it naturally stirred the imagination. It seemed the precursor of the ruin of the entire civilized world. Men were appalled at the thought that a barbarian army had entered "golden Rome," the nursing mother of the nations.¹⁵ To the pagans it appeared a sure sign that the gods whom Christianity had displaced had abandoned Rome to its fate, and a reaction in favor of the old religion was the result.¹⁶ To counteract this Augustine devoted thirteen years to the development of the idea of a *Civitas Dei* existing from the creation on earth, a perfect state contrasted with the evil polity of the world. But in the seventeen books of his treatise the description of the Divine State occupies but little space, most of the work being devoted to answering the current objection that Christianity was responsible for the world-

¹⁴ The late Dr. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, Vol. I, Part II, p. 803, after doing justice to the conception of Augustine, adds, "It may be said that the book is less than its title."

¹⁵ *Primum urbes inter divom domus aurea Roma. And
Hæc est quæ gremio materno numine fovet.*

¹⁶ This is the main argument of the early books of the *De Civitate Dei*. The elaborateness of Augustine's refutation of heathenism is a proof of its strength even though the Empire was nominally Christian.

ruin, apparent in the fall of Rome, and to the refutation of heathenism generally. In the first ten books the city of God is hardly mentioned, nor does the name, *Civitas Dei*, occur after the first chapter till the fifth book.¹⁷ Augustine labors to show that the troubles of his age are no worse than were endured in former ages; that the Goths, Arians though they were, treated the city of Rome with a humanity not known in pre-Christian times.¹⁸ He exposes the non-moral character of paganism and the badness of the ancient Roman religion.¹⁹ He shows that the greatest and most victorious nations are not necessarily the happiest, discusses natural and civil theology, deals with Hermes Trismegistus, Apuleius, and Porphyry, and declares Platonism to be the best philosophy of the ancient world.²⁰ He explains the Christian doctrine of angels and demons,²¹ dilates on the freedom of the will, and draws a comparison between the history of the world and that of God's chosen race.²² In short, so many topics are advanced and so much of the theology characteristic of the author is introduced that the City of God seems in danger of falling into the background.

After showing that the great prosperity of the ancient Romans was due to the virtues which they practised and not to their religion, the Eternal City is contrasted with the City of Rome: "No man is born in it because no man dies in it. It is in heaven and we have a promise of it during our pilgrimage on earth."²³ We give the name of the City of God," he says in a later book, "unto that society whereof that Scripture bears witness, which has got the most excellent authority and preëminence of all other works whatsoever, by the disposing of the divine

¹⁷ De Civitate Dei, V, 16.

¹⁸ Ibid. I, 1.

¹⁹ Ibid. II, 4 ff., and III, 2 ff.

²⁰ Ibid. VIII, 1-2.

²¹ Ibid. IX, passim.

²² Ibid. XVI, passim.

²³ Ibid. V, 16. Illa civitas sempiterna est: ibi nullus oritur, quia nullus moritur.

providence, not the affection of man's judgments." ²⁴ In this world the "two cities lie confusedly together," ²⁵ and Augustine shows that they arose "from the difference between the angelical powers." ²⁶ In elaborating his theory Augustine deals with the fall of the angels and the creation, all leading up to the statement that "in the first man the foresaid two societies or cities, had original; yet not evidently, but unto God's prescience, for from him were the rest of men to come; some to be made fellow-citizens with the angels in joy, and some with the devils in torment, by the secret but just judgment of God." ²⁷ The early narrative of Scripture shows the two cities to be characterized by phases of mind each caused by a different sort of love: "self-love in contempt of God, . . . and love of God in contempt of oneself." ²⁸

Among men the two cities began with the posterity of Adam; Cain, the first builder of a city whose name means possession representing the worldly, and Abel the heavenly state. ²⁹ Following Paul, Augustine applies the stories of Hagar and Ishmael, Sarah and Isaac to illustrate his thesis. ³⁰ He concludes this part of his argument by emphasizing his peculiar doctrine of reprobation and election. ³¹

From the remainder of the treatise a few selected passages will reveal the character of the *Civitas Dei* as set forth by Augustine. It is only in part on earth, its true home being heaven, and its earthly citizens are but pilgrims. ³² The bliss of its true citizens in this world is hope, and it is contrasted with the City of the Wicked,

²⁴ De Civitate Dei, XI, 1. Civitatem Dei dicimus cujus ea scriptura testis est, quæ non fortuitis motibus animorum, sed plane summæ dispositione providentiæ super omnes omnium gentium litteras, omnia sibi genera ingeniorum humanorum divina excellens auctoritate subiecit.

²⁵ Ibid. In hoc interim sæculo perplexas quodammodo . . . invicemque permixtas.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid. XII, 27. Quamvis occulto dei judicio, sed tamen iusto.

²⁸ Ibid. XIV, 28.

²⁹ Ibid. XV, 5.

³⁰ Ibid. XV, 2.

³¹ Ibid. XVIII, 21.

³² Ibid. XIX, 17.

where God does not govern and men do not obey.³³ "The day of judgment which will come at the end will not however be so much a day of deliverance or even one on which judgment is meted out, but of the vindication of all God's judgments since the Creation." "When we come to that great judgment, properly called the day of doom . . . we shall not only see all things apparent but acknowledge all the judgments of God from the first to the last to be firmly grounded on justice."³⁴ The last two books treat, the first the punishment of the wicked, refuting all the arguments against its being eternal, and also the objections to the flesh becoming eternal at the Resurrection in order that it may be everlastingly punished; and the second, of the happiness of the righteous in heaven their true home, the real City of God.

The importance of the treatise of Augustine, in which he develops his idea of the City in God, lies in its being the matured outcome of the thought of perhaps the greatest of the Fathers, who certainly did more than any one to mould the ideals, not only of the Middle Ages, but also of the Reformation. No one can fail to be struck by the absence of the influence of the aspect of Christianity to be found in the Synoptists and the Acts. In the first place, there is no allusion to a kingdom, in the Hebraic sense. Those whom God has chosen belong rather to a State (*Civitas*, *πολιτευμα*), an essentially Pauline conception. With Augustine and with western Christianity, which he so profoundly influenced, Paul, and not the earlier gospel teaching, was the dominant factor. The approaching kingdom became a "State," which had existed since the fall of the angels and united

³³ De Civitate Dei, XIX, 19, 24.

³⁴ Healey's translation of De Civitate Dei, XX, 2. Cum vero ad illud dei iudicium venerimus, cuius tempus proprie dies iudicii, et aliquando dies domini nuncupatur; non solum quaecumque tunc judicabuntur, verum etiam quaecumque ab initio iudicata, et quaecumque usque ad illud tempus adhuc iudicanda sunt, apparebunt esse iustissima.

the seen with the unseen. The hopes which Jesus had aroused are deferred; the Second Coming is not a vital part in the scheme, except in so far that it will ultimately destroy the City of Evil. Even the Old Testament is treated less as a source of Messianic proof-texts than as by its narrative demonstrating the continuity of revelation in history.

But this change of outlook is not to be placed in the days of Augustine. It is due rather to Paul. Whether as compositions the Synoptists and Acts are earlier or later than the Pauline letters does not affect the fact that in them the doctrine of the Messianic kingdom is more primitive than that of Paul, who, especially in the later Epistles, makes it more and more centred in a spiritualized Church. In this Augustine strictly follows Paul; for, at any rate in the *De Civitate Dei*, to him, as to the Apostle, the Church is the City of God which has existed from creation both as visible and invisible. Even the calamities of his age cannot make Augustine turn to the Messianic hopes of a cruder Christianity. At the same time he does not advance beyond Paul in his theory of the Church. The *Civitas Dei* is simply the *πολίτευμα ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* of the Epistle to the Philippians. It is in no sense a part of the secular State, an *imperium in imperio*, nor does it claim the right to dictate. Like Paul, Augustine teaches submission to the government, and Christians must now suffer, as in the early Church, when their conscience forbids them to obey. In this treatise there is no trace of any mediæval or post-Reformation theory of Church and State, nor is the Christian hierarchy more than alluded to. Still more significant is it that the words of Christ are rarely quoted and he is not regarded as either a teacher or example to mankind, but as the deified Saviour.³⁵ It is hardly an exaggeration to affirm that the entire theory

³⁵ *De Civitate Dei*, IX, 15.

might have been maintained and developed by a theologian who had completely disregarded the Synoptic narrative. Even in the description of the final vision in the Celestial City Christ is not introduced. This mixture of orthodox Nicene theology with what is practically an unitarian piety is present here and in many another early *Summa* of Christian doctrine. Of the Messianic kingdom set forth in early Christian writings scarcely a trace remains. Augustine seems to have been far more influenced by the Stoic idea of a heavenly State than by the promises of Jesus or the hopes of his immediate disciples. His "City of God" does not seem in any way to have Christ as the centre of all. Unconsciously the tendency has been to move away from the Christianity of the Synoptists, the Acts, and the Apocalypse.

SOME OLD UNPUBLISHED LETTERS

EDITED BY PRESERVED SMITH

CAMBRIDGE

Perhaps the most remarkable collection of autograph letters in the world is that made by the late Frederic A. Dreer and now housed in the Pennsylvania Historical Society at 1300 Locust Street, Philadelphia. Among the several thousand letters, there are specimens of the writing of most of the famous people who have lived during the last four centuries. During various short visits at Philadelphia I have run through the whole collection and have copied fifty of the most important epistles written during the period before 1650. For, to my great surprise, a number of the most valuable have lain for all these centuries unknown. Doubtless the fact that the collection is seldom seen by scholars combines with the difficulty of the paleography to lock up many a historical secret well worth the publishing.

For the present article I have selected a few letters bearing on Church history. Five of the most important I shall publish here. A few others, previously published, I have registered and collated, if their value seemed to justify it. The thread of continuity uniting the whole series is found in their religious interest. Doubtless the most valuable of the lot here published is that of Farel to Calvin, speaking, as it does, of Bucer's death, of the famous Bolsec affair, of the poets of the circle of Margaret of Navarre, and of the hitherto imperfectly known difficulties of Calvin with James Bernard. Of like importance is the communication of Hedio on Luther's death,

the Council of Trent and other matters. Of less value are the others, but I trust none here printed is too trivial to be worth the trouble of reading.

Before starting on the pleasant labor of transcription I must thank several of my friends for kind assistance. Professor Charles M. Jacobs has gone over most of the Farel letter. Professor George T. Northup and Professor Marinoni have kindly assisted me in editing the Italian letter. As they have not seen the original I desire to state that they are not responsible for the readings. My father has looked up a few points in books not accessible to me. I now proceed to present the letters in chronological order.

1. JOHN DE' MEDICI TO PETER DE' MEDICI

SAN MINIATO, February 26, 1493

John Cardinal de' Medici, afterwards Pope Leo X, writes to his brother Peter begging him to elevate a certain Bartholomew del Maestro to the college of Signori, because, he says, the man has always been favorable to them and had even treated him, the evening before, on his passage through Signa, to lampreys. Is not the whole spirit of the Renaissance papacy perceptible in this missive? Private favors, even of the most trivial sort, were rewarded with public office. Government was purely personal.

[Address] Magnifico Fratri hon. Petro de' Medicis, Florentia.

Magnifico Fr hon. Io ti dissi alli giorni passati come desideramo che Bartholomeo del Maestro¹ de tui fussi de signori, et tu me ne rispondesti quasi affirmative de farlo. Hora essendo venuto il tempo di crearli te lo mando & cosi come io li² ho data intentione che havera questa dignita & honore alpunte sotto la promessa mi facesti ti priegho ex animo lo vogli mettere in acto, che per una gratia non potrei per hora aspectare la maggiore; & l' opera sara bene collocata in persona benivola & benemerita di casa nostra, & io sono obligato ad pure farli ogni favore per lo honore smisurato & careccie fadomi piu volte nel transito per Signa.³ A uno papa non si sian

¹ I can find nothing on him in Pastor, or Creighton, or Roscoe's Leo X, 1876. The words "de tui" indicate that he was a partisan of Peter.

² I.e., "gli."

³ A small town on the Arno between Florence and San Miniato.

potuto fare piu; hiersera ci dette insino al lamprede. Pensa se siamo obligato a farli favore. Benevale. Ex Sancto Miniato die xxvi Februarij 1492.⁴

FR. JO. CARDINALIS ⁵ DE MEDICIS.

Translation

Magnificent, honorable Brother: I told you some days ago how we wished that Bartholomeo del Maestro, your man, should belong to the Signori, and you replied as if consenting to bring it about. Now that the time for electing them has come, I inform you of it, and also how I have given him to understand that he will gain this dignity and honor immediately. In view of the promise you made me, I beg you from the bottom of my heart to be pleased to fulfil it, for in the way of a favor I could not now expect a greater. And the trouble will be well spent upon a person kindly and well deserving of our house; and I am also obliged to do him every favor in return for the excessive honor and acts of kindness shown me several times as I passed through Signa. Greater could not have been done to a pope. Last evening he even gave me lampreys. Consider whether we are compelled to show him favor. Farewell. San Miniato, February 26, 1492-3.

Your brother, JOHN CARDINAL DE' MEDICI.

2. LUTHER TO SPALATIN, 1524

This letter is published in Enders: *Luther's Briefwechsel*, iv, 267, with the wrong date, 1523. For collation with the original, see *Luther's Correspondence and other contemporary Letters*, vol. ii, translated and edited by Preserved Smith and C. M. Jacobs, 1918, p. 557.

3. ERASMUS TO LEWIS BER, JANUARY 26, 1527

This witty and historical letter has just been published in *Luther's Correspondence*, vol. ii, the original on pp. 532 f., and a translation and notes, pp. 393 ff.

⁴ According to the Roman and Florentine method of beginning the year on Lady Day, this would mean 1493. See A. Giry: *Manuel de diplomatique*, 1894, p. 127. According to Roscoe (Leo X, 1876, i. 25), John de' Medici had removed to Rome on March 12, 1492. Either he had just returned for a visit or Roscoe mistakes the date 1492 for 1493.

⁵ John de' Medici, born 1475, was made a priest at the age of 7 and given the red hat at 13. When he wrote this letter he was only 17.

4. CASPAR HEDIO TO COUNT PHILIP OF HANAU

STRASSBURG, March 16 and 19, 1546

Hedio (1494-1552) was, after his advent to Strassburg in 1523, one of the leading reformers there until his death.

Philip IV, Count of Hanau-Lichtenberg (†1590), took part in the Religious Peace of 1555.

[Address] Dem Wolgebornen Hern Hern Philippen Grauen zu Hanau und Hern zu Liechtenberg, meinem gnedigen Hern. Zur ei[gnen] Handen.

Hochgeborner, Gnediger Her. E[ure] g[nade] seyen meine unterthenige dienst Zubevor. Gnediger Her. Auf dem xviii tag february ist doctor Martinus Lutherus got ergeben zu Eysleben,⁶ da er die grauen von Mansfeld einer grossen uneynikeit halb miteinander vertragen hat. Sint beisamen auch graf Albrecht und sein gemahl samnt vilen predigern. Und ist dass sein letstes gepet gewesen:

Almechtiger got und vatter meines lieben hern Jesu Christi denn ich gelert und bekannt, den der Bapst und die welt lestert und schendet, erbarm dich mein und nimm mein seel in deine hand. Und als er etliche ort auss der schrift, die ganz trostlich sint, gesprochen, als namlich Joh. am 3 cap., Als hat Got die welt lieb gehapt, das er sein sonn gab auf das der an ym glaucht hatt das ewig leben &c, ist er verschyden. Das habe E.g. ich undertheniger meinung nit wöllen verhalten.

Darauf aber Culmannus⁷ E.g. zum Superattendentem nit werden mag, habe ich sust nachfragen ob got der her einen andern wolte anzeigen damit die selbige Kirchen wol versehen. Der almechtige erhalt E.g. zu seinem preiss und der Unterthenigen Wolfahrt. Amen in eil. Strassburg den 16 martij 1546.

E.g. Underth.

C. HEDIO, D.

⁶ Though this letter has no independent value as a source for Luther's last hours, it is interesting as one of the first accounts known to us. Eight letters on the same subject have been published by G. Kawerau in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1881, 1907, and 1913. On the literature of the subject see my *Life of Luther*, p. 470. Since that was written a good deal has come out. The most important texts have been published by J. Strieder: *Authentische Berichte über Luthers letzte Lebensstunden*, 1912. Two accounts of the death have recently been discovered in America, one published by Spaeth in *Lutheran Church Review*, April, 1910, believed by him to be by John Albrecht. The value of the document is denied by Strieder in *Historische Vierteljahrsschrift*, xv, 1912, 379 ff. G. L. Burr published another account, found written in a Bible published 1546, and printed it in the *American Historical Review*, July, 1911. The author is unknown and the account worthless. See also J. Herderschee: "Luther's Laatste Levensdagen," *Theologis. Tijdschrift*, 51, 5 (1917).

⁷ Leonard Culmann (1497 or 1498-1562), a preacher at Nuremberg, where he defended the Osiandrian doctrines. *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*.

Her Martin Bucer hat woll ein meinung gehapt E.G. anzuzeigen einen gnant Antonius Schorus⁸ von Louvain, der fein und gelert, aber der sprach halben zu sorge onverstandig. Zu dem ist er schon gen Heidelberg ein pedagogium dasselbst zu halten.

Auss Regensburg sint brief kumen des dato 12 martij. Und ist das Colloquium⁹ in eines aufzug des wegen k.Mt.¹⁰ mandat der ein form prescribit die dan unsern beschwerlich ist, darauf sie gegenbericht geben haben. Auch hat K.Mt. zu den vorige ij praesidenten den 3 geordnet, hern Julium Pflug.¹¹

Zu Trient ist der hochste handel in der disputation ob der Bapst uber dag Concilium oder das Concilium uber ym. Und achtet man Bepstliche h[eiligkeit] werde unterstann das Concilium zu Rhom, Bononij oder Mantua zulest.¹²

Es gih noch sprache das K.Mt. woll in Hispania und fur Algeria.

E.g. habe ich dass zurvorige verzeichnet ganz Undertheniger meinung zu gefallen.

In eyl fritag das xix Martij.

CASPAR HEDIO.

Translation

Highborn, Gracious Lord, my humble service to your Grace.

Gracious Lord, on the 18th day of February Dr. Martin Luther was given to God at Eisleben, after he had reconciled the Counts of Mansfeld who had been at odds. With him were Count Albert and his wife together with many preachers. And this was his last prayer:

Almighty God and Father of my dear Lord Jesus Christ, whom I have taught and confessed, and whom the pope and the world blasphemes and reviles, pity me and take my soul in thy hand. And after he had repeated some very comfortable texts from Scripture

⁸ Antony van Schore, or Schorus (1525-52), after studying at Strassburg matriculated at Heidelberg October 16, 1546, where, as this letter informs us, he began tutoring other youths. He published works on philosophy. *Allge. Deu. Biog.* Evidently at this time he did not speak High German, but only Dutch.

⁹ On this conference at Ratisbon, opened January 27, see Pastor: *History of the Popes*, English, xii, 278 ff.

¹⁰ "Kaiserliche Majestät," i.e., Charles V.

¹¹ Julius von Pflug (1499-1564), a moderate Catholic, elected Bishop of Naumburg 1541, but not installed until 1547. He declined the presidency of the conference, offered him by Charles.

¹² The Council of Trent opened with a passionate dispute between the pope and the delegates. See Pastor: *History of the Popes*, English translation, xii, 1914, chap. 6. This led to the expectation that the pope would transfer the council to Rome, Bologna, or Mantua.

(as, for example, John 3 16, "God so loved the world that he gave his son, so that whosoever believeth on him hath eternal life," &c.) he passed away. It was my humble wish not to keep your Grace in ignorance of this.

As Culmann cannot be your Grace's Superintendent,¹³ I have looked elsewhere to see if God the Lord would point out any one else to provide your church with. The Almighty keep your Grace to his glory and your subjects welfare. Amen. In haste. Strassburg, March 16, 1546.

Your Grace's humble,

Dr. C. HEDIO.

P.S. Martin Bucer thought of recommending to your Grace one called Anthony Schorus of Louvain who is fine and learned, but, alas, doesn't know the language. Moreover he has just gone to Heidelberg to tutor boys there.

Letters dated March 12 have come from Ratisbon. The Conference there is in turmoil because his Majesty's decree prescribes a form which is injurious to our people, wherefore they have made a counter-report against it. Also his Majesty, in addition to the two first presidents, has named a third, Julius Pflug.

The principal business at Trent is the dispute whether the pope is superior to the council or the council superior to him. It is thought his Holiness will find some way to translate the council to Rome, Bologna, or Mantua.

There is a rumor that his Imperial Majesty will go to Spain and against Algiers.

I have humbly noted all this for your Grace's pleasure.

In haste, Friday, March 19.

CASPAR HEDIO.

5. WILLIAM FAREL TO JOHN CALVIN AT GENEVA

NEUCHÂTEL, May 25, 1551

Farel (1489-1565), the well known reformer and precursor of Calvin. The most recent lives of him by W. Bevan, 1893, by J. J. Herzog in the *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, and by Mulot in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1908, pp. 362-84, 513-42. Readers of his letters are aware of the obscurity of his style. Many of his epistles to Calvin, printed in the *Corpus Reformatorum*, are headed by the editor with some such comment as "more suo de multis et variis satis obscure." (*Calvini opera*, xvii, ep. 2797.) He wrote a tiny and difficult hand. Never-

¹³ An ecclesiastical officer often called the Lutheran equivalent of the bishop.

theless I have deciphered it and have succeeded in explaining the sense of the epistle, which throws light on some letters of Calvin, and on important events.

S. Christophorus¹⁴ vulnus quod accepimus per suam absentiam quod non facile curabitur, intempestiva enim facit abitio et longior mora quam negotia omnia ferent, vulnus inquam illud lenivit ut pene non angor, quamvis grave, ob proximi recordationem, ut merito gratias agam D[eo] & gratulor non modo tibi potiss[imum] & ecclesiae ob fructum quem spero, vero etiam Christophoro, qui huius a me admonitus, fidam narravit operam, sumpta evectione ex colloquio quem habueramus in sessione.¹⁵

Jacobus Bernardus¹⁶ ne eum fraudem eius operae qua D[eus] voluit per eum uti, prout non detrectavit olim pro instauranda ecclesia ista, quam D[eus] dederat impendere; & ut sciat me horum non immemorem nec ingratum, ut nosti me solitum referre officia istius, hoc addes ut meo nomine ei agas gratias, & observet ut pergat semper talibus vere christianis officiis, eum sibi magis et magis demonstrare, quod spero facturum, suo ipsius et ecclesiae commodo & fructu non vulgari, meo vero quam ingenti gaudio, quo triumpho dum video eum nobis salvum superesse, dum alios defleo, non modo salvum sed item ecclesiae Christi utilem. Quod ad primum attinet, cuius initia & progressus, quamvis quisquiliae multae fuerunt admixtae grano, tamen quia D[ei] fuerunt, quae bona fuerunt, & non parum ecclesiae contulerunt, Deo operante in creatura sua, fieri non potest. Quae creatura Dei, quia a Deo prodijt, mihi chara ob dona quae ferverunt, mihi multo chariorem sat efficiat Christus expurgans omnia et perfecta dans ut evangelio serviens pergendo et perseverando in finem usque, sit quam chariss[ima]. Tu qui pater es fuisti et eris, quid potes aliud quam haberi quam chariss[imus]

¹⁴ Christopher Fabri or Libertetus, often spoken of as Farel's colleague at Neuchâtel. He succeeded Farel after his death. See *La France Protestante*. He had gone to Geneva; see Calvin's answer, June 15, *Calvini Opera*, xiv, 133. On April 27, Farel speaks of a "colleague" suddenly leaving; *ibid.* xiv, 112.

¹⁵ Sic for "sessione," referring to the session of the Synod of Neuchâtel held in March, on which cf. letters of that date.

¹⁶ James Bernard, formerly guardian of the Franciscans of Rive, who had become Protestant before Calvin's arrival in Geneva. He was a special friend of Farel, who blessed his marriage in August, 1535. Doumergue: *Jean Calvin*, ii, 129.

He had done something to offend Calvin and now wished to be reconciled. Farel here intercedes for him quite passionately. Calvin replied on June 15 (*Opera*, xiv, 133): "Quod ad nostrum amicum νεοπαλαιόν spectat, ego vero eum, ut mones et hortaris, sedulo fovebo, et collegis meis ero autor ut idem faciant. Sed crede mihi, nihil sincerum apparet." See the whole passage. The editor, not knowing to whom Calvin refers, cautiously suggests Perrinus, but must be corrected by this new letter.

quem proprio etiam sanguine et vita tua optasses pridem Christo redditum; quid nunc potes aliud quam salvum amplexari, & siquid morbi supersit, unde non plena favorum moenia¹⁷ non ut optas¹⁸ videris, non prorsus aversari et desinere eum qui melioratus cupit haberi, & qui spem fecit sanitatis plenae aliquando parandae? Faciunt¹⁹ & Neo[comi] collegae omnes, quibus tam est cordi omnium salus, ne alienent istum tam utilem; sed ego mihi et meo affectui nimis indulgeo et nihil mirum, nam tantum non extra me sum, & somniare mihi videor, et reduces ex captivitate tam deplorata sibi videbantur. Et quamvis collegis meis nihil opus subire meis hortatibus & multominus tibi, tamen plene novi vos lucem honorantes enim qualemcunque, ita in D[ei] amore, licet praeter meritum, etsi non posset addi aliquid vestro quam sanctissimo amoris et charitati in privatis, cum sit quam maximus, nihil tamen abfuturum etsi non tantus esset quantus est, aliquid me obtestante abfuturum, ut gaudium meum perficiatur.

Monachus Vigiarensis²⁰ multa sibi promittit & in nonnullis utrumque Franciscum²¹ habet; non reformantes enim humani sententiam de divinis, sensum proprium non verbum D[ei] ponderant. Ex Vireto²² alia audio quam ex Christophoro, apud Viretum dixit Christophorus se audito aliter sensisse quam prius. Christophorus refert impugnasse eius sententiam et conventum ubi absolverit quae scribit, haec mittere ut audiat quid dicturi simus; sed alio mittat si valet bellumque indicat Deo. Si tu et quae quam apertissime ex scripturis plenoque Dei verbo, illi bullae²³ mox mox [sic] crepiturae non satisfacis, scilicet ego satisfaciam? Plenius omnia ex Vireto. Martem ridendum sequitur ridiculus Mercurius; it illa in

¹⁷ Sic for munia, a spelling found elsewhere.

¹⁸ Sic; one might expect optare.

¹⁹ I.e., they are all treating Bernard well, as Farel wishes Calvin to do, in order not to alienate him again.

²⁰ I.e., of Veigy, a town near Geneva. Bolsec is spoken of as "the monk" by Farel on June 29 (Calvini Opera, xiv, 143), and is meant here. Jerome Hermes Bolsec (†1585), a Carmelite monk of Paris, whence he went to Ferrara and there became almoner of the Duchess Renée. In 1551 he went to Veigy and then to Geneva, where he quarreled with Calvin, though he had previously embraced the Reformed religion, was first imprisoned and then banished. See W. Walker: John Calvin, 1906, pp. 315 ff; H. Fazy: Procès de Bolsec in Mémoires de l'Inst. nat. génevois, x, 1866.

²¹ In his letter of June 29 (see last note), Farel writes: "Non sperassem tantam mutationem in utroque Francisco: sed sanandos credo. De monacho parum spei est." The editor informs us that one of these Francisci was Sampaulinus, the other he does not know.

²² Peter Viret (1511-71), pastor at Lausanne.

²³ "That bladder," a term of contempt often used by Luther; children's rattles were made of them. Luther's Correspondence, ii, 107.

intentione infimum abys[um], ita vir in aeterna praeordinatione quam vult impetere et enectare, in cinerem vectitur.

Tibi et Colladinis²⁴ et reliquis quid debemus pro labore impenso pauperibus?

Quam vereor ne poetis Margaritae²⁵ malorum omnium radix avaritia fidem & pietatem extinguit omnem! Judas, venundato Christo, sumpta biretta,²⁶ pro Christo Satanam habet durum. Suos novit D[eus]; per eos efficit quod statuit. Non erit vanus labor servorum D[ei]; etiamque flentes seminant messent cum gaudio. Vale.

Accepi pij Bucer²⁷ postremas tandem litteras. Quale pectus! Quis sese demittit tantus! In luctu gaudiendum quod homo tam nobis amicus ad D[eum] migravit. Nec dubito quin migrans nos D[eo] commendavit. Quantum in te recte sensiit & te merito amavit! Magno par est magnificari. Tantum in me ob nimium amorem hallucinatus est, tanti faciens quae ad se scribentur quae potius impensa erant, quod vellem te aliquando idem facere. Cum tam saepe in te peccem scribendo aliter quam decet, cum aliud non noxius²⁸ quam ita misere peccare et semel me admonuisti de ijs quae ad tantum virum scribebam. Forte utrinque rudem habeas amicum; posses ad meliora trahere hunc tam senem. Qui sunt duri, apti ad meliora. Hanc quaeso operam ne graveris mihi impendere, licet tibi imo debes quam liberrime. Quamvis in omnibus cedam Bucero²⁹ tamen amore et affectu in te et tui observatione nihil cedo. Quamdiu hunc furore castiga mone et urge amicum, et quanto liberius & — ut mortuus sum — amarius feceris, tanto mihi gratior & magis officium faciens eris. Colimus qui supersimus sanctam memoriam donec ad ripam quam amicissimam & ad charissimum amicorum coetum qui progresserunt migremus, divinae voluntati grati gratias agentes, quod quamdiu visum fuit in hac miseriarum

²⁴ Leon and Germain Colladon, who came to Geneva in August, 1550 (La France Protestante). Farel's spelling is wrong but found elsewhere.

²⁵ It is possible that this is a reference to Ronsard, whose Odes appeared 1550, and to his protector Margaret of Savoy. But it is more probable that Farel was thinking of Margaret of Navarre, who died 1549, and had been a protector of the "Libertins"; see Walker's Calvin. Rabelais was one of those who claimed her protection, and who had just been branded by Calvin in his *De Scandalis*, 1550. See L. Thuasne: *Études sur Rabelais*, 1904, pp. 402 ff.; Calvin's Opera, viii, 45; Doumergue: *Jean Calvin*, i, 376.

²⁶ This seems to be Farel's spelling, like the Italian and modern English; the usual Latin form was *birretum*.

²⁷ Bucer died at Cambridge, February 27, 1551. Farel had already spoken of his death, April 27, Calvin's Opera, xiv, 112. Calvin's reply to Farel of June 15 has in mind what Farel here says, *ibid.* xiv, 133, and note.

²⁸ Used as a comparative, perhaps permissible.

²⁹ So underlined by Farel.

valle tantos nobis utendos dedit annos. Neque lingua neque solum aut quidvis aliud hanc potuit amicitiam impedire quae in finem usque integra duravit; si sata in lachrymis hic et culta, tantum habe solidi gaudij quid, ubi in messe pleni referentur manipuli! O quam bonus est D[eus] noster qui tam malos non aversatos sed bonitate filij vestitos beat omnes quam maximo bono quod in Christo habemus. Ea addit tam cumulate quae non modo pijs expetenda sunt valde, in D[eo] unum esse, sed ipsis etiam in tenebris agentibus. Tamen et hoc bonum inter optima reputatum est. Et ut sensu Dei non potest homo rogitationem excludere quin illi quantumvis ignoto primus deferat, ita amicos secundo habeat loco. O si miseri verum Deum noscerent & quid velit et jubeat, & eo tenderent, & si veros amicos & quid amici velint, quot et quantis essent liberati malis! Utrumque per ineffabilem Dei clementiam novimus & Deum & quid velit & quid jubeat, & quid amici, nempe ut illustretur Christi gloria. Quid enim tanto opere amplexaris in tuo et nostro Normandio,³⁰ ut de alijs taceam, nisi putatur cuius nosti esse quam studiosiss [imus]. Ego quid in te aliud volo? Pergendum nobis est in laudibus Dei nostri, O quam immeritos peccatores amat et ornat merito Christi, quem praedicat colit adorat omnis terra; nihil supersit quod non laudem eius depraedicat.

Vale felix et totus in Do[mino] & vive in via Christi ut gygas, vince calamitatem calamitosi mundi, sicco pede pertransi hoc mare laeteque amarum & quae te in horas decumbere cogunt aegritudines, sanissimas summa alacritate vince. Servat te Christus infractum ad omnia, ut forma³¹ gregis sis ad omnia summa stimulata³² pro Christo ferenda et peragenda. Saluta quaeso omnes. Proximis literis convectis spero aliud successum quam priorem, quod faxit Christus. Collega³³ te salutat.

Neocomi, 25 Maij 1551.

Tuus totus FARELLUS.

Translation

Greeting. The wound which we received by the absence of Christopher Fabri will not easily be healed, for his untimely departure and delay longer than his business requires, make it severe.

³⁰ One of Calvin's colleagues at Geneva, Laurent de Normandie, born at Noyon c. 1510, came to Geneva 1548, died 1569. Cf. Doumergue: Jean Calvin, iii, 1905, pp. 620 ff.

³¹ I.e., "a model," a classical use, rather startling with *gregis*, possibly due to a confused reminiscence of the Virgilian "formosi pastor gregis."

³² Cf. Acts 26 14.

³³ Who this colleague was I cannot determine.

And yet it greatly relieves the pain, although sharp, to remember what recently happened, so that I may justly thank God and congratulate not only you primarily and the church on account of the fruit which I hope from him, but also I congratulate Christopher who, admonished of this very thing by me, had related to me his faithful work, when he had taken his departure after the conversation which we had at the synod.

Let me not cheat James Bernard of the work which God wished to accomplish through him, inasmuch as formerly he was not unprofitable in the founding of the church which God gave into his care. Let him know that I am not forgetful of what he has done, nor ungrateful, and, as you know that I am accustomed to repay such favors, please thank him in my name and let him take heed always to continue in the performance of such truly Christian duties, and let him prove himself, as I hope he will do, profitable unto himself and to the church, bringing forth no common fruit. How great will be my joy, my triumph, when I see him saved with us (while I weep for others), yea, not only saved but useful to the church of Christ. Although much refuse was mixed with the wheat in his first deeds and in his progress since then, yet because these deeds were of God they could not be otherwise than good and not a little profitable unto the church, God working in his creature. This creature of God coming from God, was dear to me on account of his fervent gifts; but Christ has made him much dearer, indeed as dear as possible, since he has purged him and given him all perfect gifts so that he may serve the gospel, continuing and persevering even unto the end. How could you, who are, were, and will be a father, be held other than most dear by him whom you wished formerly to give back to Christ even at the cost of your own life? What else can you do save embrace him now that he is saved? If any of his old weakness is left by reason of which you are unable to give him your full favor, though you do not seem to wish this, yet turn not altogether from him and do not leave him who wishes to be considered as improved, and who offers ground for hope that he will soon be again completely whole. All my colleagues at Neuchâtel, who care so much for the salvation of all, act thus, lest they should alienate this so useful man. If I yield too much to my affection for him, it is no wonder, for I am almost beside myself, and I seem to myself to dream and they seem to themselves like exiles returning from a miserable captivity. And although there is no need for my colleagues to obey my exhortations, and still less need for you to do so, nevertheless I have always known you to honor every light and to live in the love of God. And

although in personal matters nothing could be added to your holy love and devotion, inasmuch as they are as great as possible, yet let it not be lacking in this, even if he (Bernard) was not what he is, but accept my testimony for him, that my joy may be perfected.

The monk of Veigy (Bolsec) promises himself great things and in some matters he has seduced both the Francisces, for they do not distinguish the human dregs from the divine matter, and they consider rather their own reason than the Word of God. The account given me by Viret differed from that given by Christopher, and when Viret was present Christopher said that he had changed his opinion. Christopher says that he opposed his (Bolsec's) opinion, and that when he (Bolsec) had completed what he has written he would do, he will send the agreement here in order to learn what we shall say. But let him send it elsewhere if he is able, and declare war on God. If you and the clear texts of Scripture adduced by you could not satisfy that bladder that will soon make a noise, how, pray, could I satisfy him? You will learn more from Viret. A ridiculous Mercury follows an absurd Mars. He is going his own way to the lowest abyss; the man is on the way to be burnt to ashes by the very eternal predestination which he wishes to attack and annihilate.

What do we not owe to you and to the Colladons and the rest for the labor you have lavished on the poor?

How I fear that avarice, that root of all evils, has extinguished all faith and piety in the poets of Margaret! Judas, having sold Christ and taken the biretta, instead of Christ has that hard master Satan. God knows his own, and through them does what he has ordained. The labor of the servants of God will not be in vain; though they sow weeping they will reap with joy. Farewell.

I have received pious Bucer's last letter. What a heart! What a man has gone! We must rejoice in our sorrow that a man so fond of us has journeyed to God. I have no doubt that after his journey he commended us to God. How rightly he thought of you and how justly he loved you! It is right to be celebrated by a great man. He was foolish to love me as he did, for he made much of all that was written to him though he should rather have sifted it, as I hope that you also will sometime do; although I often sin by writing to you otherwise than as is fitting, although nothing is more harmful than to sin thus miserably and you have once warned me about the things which I wrote to such a man. Perchance you had a candid friend on either side; you may be able to lead the one who is now so old [sc. myself] to better things. Those who are hard are apt to

be improved. I beg you not to begrudge me the needful attention, although you owe it rather to yourself. Though I yield to Bucer in all things, yet in love and affection for you and reverence for you I yield not at all. Wherefore chastize, admonish, press this friend furiously, and the more freely and — as I am dead — the more harshly you do it, the more you will please me and the more you will do your duty. Let us, the survivors, cherish his holy memory until we also journey to the beloved shore and to the dear company of friends who have gone before, gratefully giving thanks to the divine will which has given us so many years to be used in this valley of miseries. No tongue nor the earth itself nor anything else has been able to hinder the friendship which has lasted untouched unto the end; if it was sowed and cultivated in tears, yet it has solid joy awaiting it when the full sheaves will be brought in at the harvest. Oh, how good is our God who does not cast us off, evil though we are, but makes us blessed clothed in the goodness of his Son and with the great gift we have in Christ! To his other blessings He richly adds this, which is greatly sought by the pious, that we shall be one in God, and He gives this gift even to those who are living in darkness. Yet this blessing is reckoned among the best. And although a man is not able, in the thought of God, to exclude petitions for himself first, yet let him have his friends in the second place. Oh, if only the wretched knew the true God, what He wishes and commands, and followed that, and if they only knew their true friends and what their friends wish, from how many and what terrible evils would they be freed! By God's ineffable mercy we know both God and his commands and our friends and what they want, namely that Christ's glory may be brightened. Wherefore let me embrace you in your and our Laurent de Normandie, not to mention others, lest I should seem to be too fond of one of whom you know.³⁴ What should I wish different in you? We must continue in the praises of our God. Oh, how He loves undeserving sinners and how He ornaments them with the merit of Christ, whom the whole earth preaches, cherishes, and adores! In fact there is nothing that does not proclaim his praise.

Farewell, be happy and live in the way of Christ like a giant; conquer the calamity of the calamitous world; dryshod pass through this happily bitter sea, and with the highest vigor overcome the maladies that at times lay you low. May Christ keep you unbroken for all things, that you may be a model to the flock in all the high trials to be borne and gone through for Christ. Give my greetings,

³⁴ I.e., Calvin himself.

please, to all. I trust that your next letter will be brought to me more safely and quickly than the last. Christ grant it. My colleague salutes you. Neuchâtel, May 25, 1551.

All yours,

FAREL.

6. INSCRIPTION BY JOHN FORSTER. 1552

John Forster, 1495-1556, Protestant born at Augsburg, a noted Hebrew scholar. A specimen of sixteenth century piety and erudition is offered herewith.

GENESIS XLIX,

[Follows a Hebrew inscription, the text of Genesis 49 18.]

Salutare tuum expecto Domine. Paraphrastes chaldaicus:³⁵ Dixit pater noster Jacob, Non expecto redemptionem Giddeonis, quae est temporaria, neque redemptionem Simpsonis filij Mannae, nam et haec est transitoria. Sed expecto redemptionem Christi filii Dauid, qui venturus est ad accersendum ad se filios Israel. Huius, inquam, redemptionem desiderat anima mea.

Haec est pia et plena consolatione Partriarchae dicti huius declaratio, pertinens ad omnem posteritatem fidelis Israelis, quod ea in rebus adversis non ad praesidia humana confugere debeat, quae aut sunt transitoria aut omnino vana. Sed ad filium Dei ex Dauide secundum carnem natum cuius aut redemptio certa est, ita quoque est vera et aeterna.

JOHANNES FORSTERUS, D.

1552.

Translation

I await thy salvation, O Lord. The author of the Chaldee paraphrase writes: Our father Jacob said, I do not await the redemption of Gideon which is temporary, nor the redemption of Samson the son of Manoah, for this also is transitory, but I await the redemption

³⁵ See the Chaldee Paraphrases in the Targum, printed in Walter's Polyglott. As my father, the Rev. Prof. Henry Preserved Smith, kindly informs me, the Targum of Jonathan at this point reads: "Dixit Jacob quando vidit Gedeonem filium Joas et Simsonem filium Manoe, qui futuri erant liberatores: Non liberationem Simsonis ego perspicio, quia liberatio temporalis fuit; sed ego salutem tuam expecto et perspicio, Domine, quia Liberatio tua liberatio saeculorum." The Jerusalem Targum reads: "Dixit pater noster Jacob: Non redemptionem Gedeonis filii Joas expectat anima mea, quae est temporalis; neque redemptionem Samsonis quae est salus creata; sed redemptionem quam dixisti verbo tuo venturam esse populo tuo filiis Israel, hanc redemptionem expectat anima mea." It will be seen that Forster had a different text before him. How far it was colored by himself, and how far it represents a genuine new reading, must be left to critics to determine.

of Christ the son of David who is to come to call unto himself all the children of Israel. His redemption, I say, my soul desireth.

This declaration of the said patriarch is pious and full of consolation pertaining to the whole posterity of faithful Israel, for in times of adversity they ought not to flee to human protection which is either transitory or altogether vain. But they should flee to the Son of God from the seed of David according to the flesh, for his redemption is certain and also is true and eternal.

Dr. JOHN FORSTER. 1552.

7. MELANCHTHON TO JOHN PETREIUS

(WITTENBERG), January 31, 1555.

This letter is not found in the *Corpus Reformatorum* nor in Bindseil's *Epistolae Melanchthonis quae in Corpore Reformatorum desiderantur*, 1874, nor is it known to Fleming and Vogt, "Nachweis von Melanchthon-Briefen," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1910 and 1912. It is printed in the catalogue of the Dreer Collection. There were two men named John Petreius. One of them, to whom Melanchthon wrote Dec. 16, 1549, *Corpus Ref.*, vii, 514, and letter in Bindseil, *op. cit.*, was a Nuremberg printer who died in 1550, see *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*. The other was in 1553 pastor in Willansdorf (see Melanchthon's letter to him, *Corpus Ref.*, viii, 29) and later pastor at Zwickau. Cf. *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, xvii, 192 line 55, where he is described as a "hotspur." The present letter is addressed to him.

[Address] Reverendo viro eruditione et virtute praestanti D. Johanni Petreio, Pastori Ecclesiae Dei in inclitya urbe Cygnea,³⁶ Amico suo carissimo.

S. D. Reverende D. Pastor, Exploravimus eruditionem hujus Wolfgangi³⁷ et comperimus eum recte tenere summam doctrinam Evangelii. Quare et te judicamus recte fecisse quod Ecclesiam ei commendasti et optamus ornatas esse talibus ingeniis multas Ecclesias. De consistorio, recte facies si ad proximum referas controversias. Sed tamen poteris cum vobis in nostrum consistorium et nostram Academiam consulere. Dei beneficio, una et concors harum regionum Ecclesia est. Nec sunt ambitiosa certamina de jurisdictione. Bene et feliciter vale. Pridie Cal. Feb. 1555.

PHILIPPUS.

³⁶ Zwickau.

³⁷ I cannot identify this Wolfgang. Probably the Album Academiae Vitebergensis, ed. C. E. Förstemann, 1841, would do this, but there is not a copy of the work to be found in America.

Translation

To the Reverend and in virtue and learning excellent Dr. John Petreius, Pastor of the Church of God in the noble city of Zwickau, his dearest friend.

Greeting. Reverend pastor, we have examined the learning of this Wolfgang and have found him rightly to hold the chief points of evan-gelic doctrine. Wherefore we think you have done right in recommending a church to him, and we wish that many churches may be adorned with pastors of such character. You will do right if you refer your controversies to the next Consistory. But you and your friends may consult our Consistory and our university. By God's blessing the church of these regions is at one and in peace, nor is there any strife of ambition about jurisdiction. Farewell. January 31, 1555.

PHILIP.

It may not be unacceptable to the reader if in this place I should add a few other notes on Melanchthon, hitherto unpublished. In the library of Mr. George Arthur Plimpton of New York there are several books with notes in Melanchthon's hand. The most important of these is the copy of Homer published by Aldus in 1517. It contains the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and the lives of Homer by Herodotus and Plutarch. There are three separate title-pages and on each of them there is an inscription stating that the book was given by Melanchthon to Luther in 1519.³⁸ That on the *Iliad* is τῷ ἐν χριστῷ παμφιλτάτῳ Μαρτίνῳ τῷ Θεολόγῳ Φίλιππος MDXIX. The inscription on the title-page of the *Odyssey* is "D. D. Re. Patri Doc. Martino Luthero Θεολόγῳ Ph. Mel." The writing on the title-page of the lives of Homer is "D. D. Rev. Pat. Martino Luthero Θεολόγῳ Philip. Melanchthon." The book is crammed with notes attributed to Melanchthon, of which a few are worth quoting. On the title-page of the *Iliad* he wrote,

³⁸ In the second volume of Luther's Correspondence, p. 177, n. 2, I mistakenly stated that the book was given by Luther to Melanchthon, instead of the other way. I was perhaps misled by Luther's assertion, "I bought a Homer to become a Greek." Did he buy it from Melanchthon, or did he have two copies?

"Est in Homeri poematis insignis suavitas cum magna gravitate." He sought for parallels to his own age as the following notes show. To Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή, he added "Locus de providentia." He notes "comminatio tyrannica" at the point where Agamemnon threatens Achilles, and when Calchas enters, only to make the quarrel worse, Melanchthon comments, "Commotio inter principes propter religionem."

Mr. Plimpton also possesses another *Iliad* printed by Aldus, without date, with some notes attributed to Melanchthon. The book was evidently used by some one as the basis of lectures, for here and there come in practical directions, of which the most frequent is "Jocum narrabis." Teacher's perennial joke was not invented in our days. Mr. Plimpton's library contains further Melanchthon's own *Institutiones Graecae Grammaticae*, Hagenau, 1518, with notes by the author intended to prepare for a subsequent edition. Finally there is in the same storehouse of rare books a copy of *Procli paraphrasis in Quatuor Ptolomaei libros de siderum effectionibus cum praefatione Philippi Melanchthonis*, 1554, with Melanchthon's name in autograph on the title-page, and, in another hand, "Doctissimo viro d. Georgio Scellar," probably indicating that Melanchthon gave it to him.

8. CALVIN TO GEORGE, COUNT OF WÜRTTEMBERG &
MONTBÉLIARD

GENEVA, July 13, 1558

This letter is published in Calvin's *Opera*, ed. Baum, Cunitz & Reuss, vol. xvii, 1877, coll. 253 ff. from a copy made by Beza. The copy varies in important particulars from the original, which I herewith collate:

Col. 253, line 4, *for spero read ut spero*.

L. 8, *for Sed excedere modestiae fines non read Sed modestiae fines excedere mihi non*.

Ll. 9-11, *the words ne vestra Celsitudo excutiendae tantae causae duas horas impendere gravetur are underlined by Calvin*.

Col. 254, ll. 17 f. *for P. read Petrus*. *The words Petrus Tussanus fallaces praetextus are underlined by Calvin*.

L. 19, *for sua et maligna read et maligna sua.*

L. 25, *for ingratitude non libenter read non libenter ingratitude.*

Ll. 28 f., *the words parum humaniter se gessit quod simultatibus are underlined by Calvin.*

L. 30, *the words me verbo uno admonuit ut me are underlined by Calvin.*

L. 31, *for meo consilio read consilio meo.*

Ll. 34 f., *the words experiri quid mea exhortatio apud eos valeret are underlined by Calvin.*

Ll. 38 f., *the words haereticis parci volens sicuti are underlined by Calvin.*

L. 46, *after factionis Calvin first wrote the words vel suae libidini addictos and then struck them out. This is worth noting as showing that the quick-tempered Reformer was capable of toning down an expression that escaped him in the heat of passion.* l. 54, *after existimationi add et otio fideliter.*

Col. 255, l. 11, *omit the words Celsitudinis vestrae obsequentissimus, evidently added by Beza as more respectful.*

L. 12, *after Calvinus add tuus.*

9. THEODORE BEZA TO PITHOU

APRIL 22, 1566

This is printed in Baird's Theodore Beza, 1899, p. 368 f., with facsimile. The printing is correct except p. 368, line 5 from the bottom "nous epargnera" should be "nous y epargnera."

Some years ago at Goodspeed's Book Shop in Boston I saw an autograph letter of Beza. I remember nothing particular about it, and inquiry at the shop elicits the information that they have sold it, they know not to whom.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE BOOK OF JOB AS A GREEK TRAGEDY RESTORED. HORACE M. KALLEN.
Moffat, Yard, & Co. 1918. Pp. xiv, 163. \$1.25.

In the earlier editions of Driver's monumental *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, one could read in a footnote the following: "Jewish scholars are often exceedingly clever and learned; but they are somewhat apt to see things in a false perspective, and to build upon superficial and *accidental* appearances extravagant and far-reaching hypotheses." This severe judgment was withdrawn in later editions. It is perhaps not unfitting for a member of his own race to quote the passage in relation to Dr. Kallen's book. As to the ability of the book and of its writer there can be no question. Though the condensed and somewhat strained style of writing is not the highest type of English, it is often picturesque, vivid, and forcible. There are many excellent observations, several pregnant utterances. But taken as a whole, the book fails to convince. It seems to the present writer exceedingly doubtful whether the verdict of time will tend to approve Dr. Kallen's theories as to the original form of *Job* or as to its teaching and its moral.

The author asks us to believe that *Job* was definitely written as an imitation or echo of an Euripidean tragedy; an echo or imitation, that is, such as a Hebrew genius, working within the limits of the legitimate and without an intimate knowledge of Euripides or Greek, might be supposed to create. A later editor or editors destroyed the dramatic form, disturbed here and there the due sequence of words, added a few interpolations, and thus produced the *Job* we know.

Now as Professor G. F. Moore in his very kindly and generous introduction rightly observes, our author's hypothesis does enable him to use as important parts of his theory and of the original re-created drama, certain passages which modern criticism does not know what to do with and commonly regards as interpolations. These passages are (1) 28, (2) 24 2-24, (3) 40 15-41 26. Any theory which presents the necessity of assuming interpolations has a certain *prima facie* fascination.

It is also true that the "play," as arranged by Dr. Kallen, has a certain plausibility (there is no question as to its ingenuity). The

prose introduction forms the Prologue, and may be roughly compared with the "Prologues" in the tragedies of Euripides. The speeches of Job and his three friends, arranged very much as we now find them but with certain transpositions, most of which have already been sanctioned and suggested by modern criticism, form the main substance of the drama. The three interpolations become the choruses. This is an exceedingly ingenious idea, and each of the three passages has a certain fitness (made the most of by our author!) in the place where Dr. Kallen puts them. Two of them are even in different metres from the dialogues. What could be more desirable? The third (the description of Behemoth and Leviathan) is, it must be confessed, in the same metre, "but is very different in theme and content." Moreover, Dr. Kallen's theory finds a place for Elihu. He seems to fill a double rôle, first as leader of the chorus (p. 127), and then as a quasi-Messenger. It is in the latter capacity that he speaks the words (or most of them) which are assigned to him in the text as we now possess it. After Elihu follows the Divine interposition and speech. This too is Euripidean, as every reader of the dramas must remember. And the epilogue is an expanded, Hebraic prose analogue of the epilogues of Euripides. So proudly does our author exclaim: "Prologue, *agon*, messenger, choruses, epiphany, epilogue, they are all evident, with just those differences from the Greek that may be expected from the difference in tradition and background between the two authors."

But surely these Euripidean resemblances are but "accidental and superficial." Interpolations, after all, are not unusual in old Hebrew writings, and the three in *Job* can more reasonably be accounted for in this manner than by turning them into choruses. It can hardly be fairly argued that their nature is "so like that of many of the Euripidean choruses" that it is "more plausible than not that they are such." The "praise of wisdom" (28) might, perhaps, be called "like," and is not easily to be accounted for as an interpolation, but the other two suggested choruses are at all events much more reasonably explicable in the ordinary manner. It is difficult to admit the propriety of Behemoth and Leviathan where Dr. Kallen places them. Job's "inflexible self-justification and challenge to God" could certainly not *only* be met by "an exhibition" of God's power; and though Dr. Kallen may call the description of the big beasts after 31 "pat to that purpose," few readers will be found to agree with him. Then the assimilation of Elihu to the Messenger is surely very far-fetched (p. 32). Nor does our author satisfactorily get over the difficulty that the Hebrew of Elihu's speeches appears

to be later than that of the main body of the work. He can only suggest apparently that these particular speeches have been partially rewritten or modified by a later hand (p. 31).

It is true that there was one Ezekiel, a Greek Jew who wrote Biblical dramas, and it is conceivable that there were Hebrew as well as Greek imitations prior to Ezekiel's imitations. But that there "must have been" Hebrew as well as Greek imitations, it is by no means legitimate to assert.

Dr. Kallen places the date of *Job* as early as 400 B.C. To suit his theory it is rather wonderful that he did not date it a hundred years later (apart from Dr. Kallen and his theory there seems no valid reason why 300 might not have been the date as probably as 400). A frail hypothesis is devised as to how the author of *Job* might have got some knowledge of Euripidean drama. He might, for instance, have actually witnessed the performance of one of the tragedies "on a visit to Egypt or the Syrian coast." He might have heard of Euripides and his plays from a friend. He might have known the Greek language, or at least enough to "catch the drift" or "retain the generic essence" of a witnessed play.

These are shadowy suppositions. That there are certain resemblances between the tone and temper of Euripides and that of the author of *Job* may perhaps be conceded, though whether the Hebrew poem "bears a relation to Jewish orthodoxy extraordinarily like that of so many of the plays of Euripides to Greek orthodoxy" must be doubted. A common criticism of their respective orthodoxies does not take us very far.

Altogether the theory of Dr. Kallen, while interesting and ingenious, must be regarded as, on the whole, a failure. *Job*, in all probability, even its most original form, was never written as a drama, and its author had more probably than not never seen or heard of any Euripidean tragedy.

More interesting to most readers than the strained attempt to prove that *Job* was originally a drama, will be the second division of Dr. Kallen's short essay, entitled *The Joban Philosophy of Life*, in which the true moral and purpose of the book is (for the first time!) exposed and explained. But here, too, able and ingenious — even profound — as our author's conclusions are, it is hardly mere conservatism, obstinacy, or obtuseness, which leads me to question their accuracy. Dr. Kallen, like the rest of us, is deeply impressed with the greatness of *Job*. And his just admiration, as it seems to me, has led him on to find in *Job* his own philosophy of life. What *he* thinks is the true "moral" of life, what *he* thinks is the right explanation

of the riddle of the universe, that he discovers already expounded by the author of *Job*. As the Hero of the Gospels has often been made to preach the particular sort of religion and of Christianity which is most congenial to each commentator in turn, so is *Job* made to preach the philosophy of Dr. Kallen. Nevertheless, fine and austere in many respects as that philosophy is, it scarcely represents that view of life and that explanation of life's riddles which it was the purpose of *Job* to set forth or even to conceal. *Job's* God was not Dr. Kallen's God, whether for better or for worse.

Job in its central assertion attains the "ultimate height, the full ripeness of the growth and unfoldment of the Hebraic theory of life" (p. 45). It seems whimsical or paradoxical that this full ripeness culminates in a God to whom prayer is useless and idle, and who, in His truest nature, is essentially beyond and indifferent to what man calls good and evil. In the growth which leads to this final "unfoldment" the prophets formed a stage and marked an advance; the Psalms, it may be surmised, were a retrogression and a backwater. Dr. Kallen is fain to allow that the "ultimate height" was heterodox and, in one sense, off the line — at all events, off the official line. That the play was preserved is due to the fact that its author "like Euripides, knew the wisdom of conveying his heterodox doctrine by means of a seductive orthodox setting" (p. 68).

The purpose of *Job* might apparently be described as an attempt to overcome the very subtle and pervasive fallacy of the human mind, which persists "in describing the unseen universe as congruous with our own will, as sharing its nature and contributing to its prosperity and final happiness" (p. 44). The Hebrew God-idea developed in "two simultaneous processes." First, Yahweh was moralized; secondly, he was depersonalized. The culmination of the two processes results in identifying him with "the course of nature regarded as a totality, with its energy and dynamic *go*, immanent in all events, transcending each, and making for righteousness" (p. 46). The last words sound as if a little, at all events, of what both the whole Old Testament and the whole New Testament understand by God had survived even in Dr. Kallen's theory. But the Divine righteousness is not what we mean by righteousness. God's justice is nothing like "the justice man conceives of and desires" (p. 70). "His justice is His wisdom, and this again is nothing else than power, force, the *go* and potency, generative and disintegrative, in things" (p. 71). It is a justice "of indifference, of cosmic impartiality, whereby each creature of God's might makes its own nature, without hindrance and without help" (p. 76). This

then is the secret of *Job*, of which it may safely be said that the author of *Job* was himself profoundly ignorant. Dr. Kallen finds important approaches to this non-moral God in the prophets, in whose teaching "conduct and destiny are correlated as cause and effect," where "there is nothing judicial, personal, voluntary," where "disaster follows wickedness or well-being follows righteousness only as indigestion follows over-eating" (p. 66). It is strange what a theory and a faith can make men see in the Bible! *Job*, however, goes much further than the Prophets: the God of *Job* is the "dynamic of the universe," entirely "incommensurable with human nature, the irreducible surd of all experience, whose being and force can be acknowledged, but not reasoned with" (p. 68). And so on.

"The fear of the Lord" is the moral of *Job*. But what does that mean? It means practical, empirical wisdom. It means man's recognition that he must "take his chance in a world" (*i.e.*, in a universe *including* God) which "does not care about him any more than about anything else" (p. 77). The justice of indifference is all which God has to offer him. Let him therefore "assert and realize the excellences appropriate to his nature as a man," in a world which was made no more for one creature than for another. Let him (and one must admire the teaching, even though it is neither "Joban" nor Judaic) "maintain his ways with courage rather than with faith, with self-respect rather than with humility, or better perhaps with a faith that is courage, a humility that is respect" (p. 78). This then is the ripest Hebrew wisdom. Here we have the austere humanism. The pathetic fallacy is wholly overcome (which the Greeks never succeeded in doing). There are no more "illusions" concerning man's relation to God. Man finds his citadel in his own soul — "even against Omnipotence itself — wherein he cherishes his integrity, and so cherishing, is victorious in the warfare of living even when life is lost" (p. 78). And this enlightenment, wisdom, self-mastery, are in accordance with "science." Thus it is that only with the coming of science has Hebraism begun "to come into its own" (p. 78).

One cannot but feel a certain sombre and austere dignity in Dr. Kallen's conclusions. In a godless, soulless, loveless universe (even though the word "soul" is still used by our author, and a God is still believed in, albeit a God of moral "indifference"), man stands up erect, undaunted, free.

But even if this sombre teaching be true, one thing it is not. It is not Judaism. Dr. Kallen's attack upon Reform or Liberal Judaism (p. 57) seems to imply that he is a Jewish nationalist of the

usual non-religious type. It is mournful indeed if this subversal and denial of Judaism, and of what both Judaism and Christianity mean by God, is to become the irreligion of a Jewish Settlement in Palestine. And it is curious to note how the position at which Dr. Kallen has arrived (and which he seeks to foist upon *Job* and upon "Hebraism") is probably in part the result of an anti-Christian bias. One would have thought that a man of Dr. Kallen's views would have got rid of the pedantry of writing B.C.E. instead of B.C. May we speak of Wednesday and Thursday, but must we not write B.C. and A.D.? More significant is the following: "The terms in which God is described throughout the drama are terms of action; the usual hypostasis of the pleasant emotions of men — of love, of goodness, of charity — is not made." "The pleasant emotions of men" — this fling is doubtless supposed to be very clever and sarcastic; is it not rather somewhat foolish and somewhat sad?

It remains to be repeated that there are many acute observations and reflections in Dr. Kallen's all too brief disquisition (for the text of *Job* occupies 77 pages and the Introductory Essay only 76), which, if space permitted, one would be glad to quote. It seems a pity that he should have accepted the identification of the Servant of the Lord (Isaiah 42, 49, and 53) with Zerubbabel, a hypothesis which is now, I think, very generally discarded.

CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

COUNTERFEIT MIRACLES. BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. 327. \$2.00.

Dr. Warfield discriminates between miracles, properly so-called, and Special Providences, answers to prayer, etc., in that the former are wrought by an unmediated act of God, apart from processes, and are connected with revelation which, or the bearers of which, they are designed to authenticate and attest. With this definition, the thesis is that miracles have been performed in Christian history since Jesus, only by the Apostles and their next successors to whom they communicated the gift by the laying on of hands. That the Apostolic Fathers make no mention of miracles shows that in their time they had ceased. From the third century on, however, they are related increasingly on account of the influence of heathenism not only, in general, upon and in the minds of Christians but also specifically through the Apocryphal Acts and Gospels copying the

heathen teratology. These ecclesiastical miracles are declared counterfeit almost by definition, since, revelation having been completed in the Apostolic Age, there was no further occasion for their existence, and since behind them, especially such as are associated with the worship of Mary, lies error and not truth. Faith-healing also, when it occurs, is at best only an instance of the general supernatural, since often means are employed, as, for example, rest, and indeed faith itself or any act of mind or will is as truly a means as medicine or the knife. The same is true of mind-cure in all its forms, including Christian Science. There may be cures which are inexplicable, but such an event is not necessarily miraculous. It is interesting to note the absence of even a suggestion that counterfeit miracles may be of diabolical origin.

The discussion, which is remarkably interesting and thorough, reinforced by abundant references to a wide range of reading on the various subjects, inevitably raises the inquiry, although Dr. Warfield does not raise it, how the New Testament miracles would stand the tests by which their counterfeit rivals are detected. The theory would be a trifle neater if the power of working miracles had been confined to Jesus himself, in whom revelation was consummate; but this restriction would be damaging to the inspiration of the Epistles and the Acts. Moreover, if a cure which requires faith on the part of the sufferer or his friends is not a miracle, since a mental act or attitude may be a means of recovery, what is to be said of the statements in the Gospels which make healings conditional upon faith? In recent years the tendency has been to maintain that miracles are not *a priori* impossible, and therefore the question as to their actual occurrence is one of evidence alone; but Dr. Warfield is too astute to be betrayed into that trap. As he repeatedly declares, the evidence for certain ecclesiastical miracles is exceedingly good; far better, one might add, *prima facie*, than for any New Testament miracle. The deliberately written testimonies of an Augustine or a Jerome are better evidence, as evidence goes, than the Gospel records of uncertain date and authorship. If the alleged miracles of the third century and later are due to the influences of the environment, was not the first century also demon-ridden (to use the author's own word concerning it), and may not the New Testament also show the effect of its influence? The author puts himself in a rather perilous position when he says of certain reports of a wonder at Lourdes:

"We are willing to believe that it happened just as it is said to have happened. We are content to know that in no case was it a miracle. . . .

It is a primary principle, therefore, that no event can be really miraculous which has implications inconsistent with fundamental religious truth . . . The whole place, says Benson, is alive with Mary. That is the very reason why we are sure that the marvels which occur there are not the direct acts of God, but are of the same order as the similar ones which have occurred at many similar shrines of many names, in many lands, serving many gods" (pp. 119-123).

That is to say, by definition, miracles accompany revelation as its attestation, and since revelation found its organic completeness in Christ, miracles have ceased and no amount of evidence can make them credible. But one has an uneasy sense that here is a vicious circle — the revelation is known to be such because accompanied by miracles, and miracles are known to be miracles because they attend revelation.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

FREEDOM AND TRUTH: and other Sermons in King's Chapel. HOWARD N. BROWN, D.D. W. B. Clarke Co. 1916. Pp. vi, 337. \$1.75.

This volume contains more than a score of sermons preached by Dr. Brown in King's Chapel, Boston, in the course of as many years, and includes also a brief and vivid historical sketch of the church. The sermons, while covering a wide range of subjects, deal almost wholly with the greater and more abiding themes of the religious life, rather than with issues of temporary and fleeting interest. There is in them, indeed, nothing of that sort of "preaching for the times" which so often degenerates into mere chatter about current events. Dr. Brown deals with large issues from a point of view which, by the long habit of meditation, has become somewhat detached. His preaching is carefully wrought, the distillation of much quiet thinking into a form far more highly finished than that of the vast majority of preachers.

It should be said at once that the result is rather far removed from the popular pulpit oratory of the day. Dr. Brown's sermons are stately rather than "snappy," more full of thought than of "punch," better calculated to produce a reasoned conviction than an emotional thrill. They contain, indeed, an admirable degree of religious warmth and a very genuine spiritual insight, but their chief characteristic is their wisdom, as persuasive as it is unobtrusive. Dr. Brown's observation of current tendencies is shrewd and his judgment upon them sagacious.

It is a criticism of the age rather than of the preacher to recognize that sermons of this type can today command only a rather limited number of hearers. With all their modernity of outlook, their style is that of the great English university preachers to whom Oxford and Cambridge used to listen with attention, or of the American Unitarians of the nineteenth century, with their clear thinking and their high appeal to the moral judgment rather than to the emotions. It requires a congregation with genuine intellectual interests and spiritual idealism to appreciate such preaching. It will be neither understood nor valued by people whose chief interest in the sermon is the hope that it will soon end that they may the more quickly reach the golf links or start the motor-car. But to those who value the great traditions of the pulpit and its position of intellectual prestige, this volume will be most welcome. It is the fruit of a long and honored ministry; the evidence that a kind of preaching which the world cannot afford to lose is still here and there to be found.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

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THE NEW ARCHEOLOGICAL DISCOVERIES AND THEIR BEARING UPON THE NEW TESTAMENT AND UPON THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. CAMDEN M. COBERN. Introduction by Edouard Naville. Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1917. Pp. xxxiv, 698. \$3.00.

This big and handsomely illustrated book by an American professor of the Bible is intended for popular readers, not for scholars, and must be judged by that aim. The author has had some experience in excavation, has seen many archæological discoveries and manuscripts, has read widely, and has diligently assembled material from many sources "to make this work a 'corpus' of all the more fascinating facts and all the most beautiful and worthy sayings that have floated down to us from the opulent centuries in which the earliest Church was trained." Unfortunately the exaggeration of expression and the indefiniteness of thought regarding his task which appear in the author's language here quoted from his preface, are characteristic of the book.

The material objects recovered from the past in modern times (as well as the ancient books and private bits of writing) have expanded and enlivened our knowledge, have sustained or corrected the conclusions of patient scholarship, occasionally (though rarely) have answered a debated question. To make from this vast mass of facts newly brought to light suitable selections which should show

clearly what the gains have been and wherein their importance lies, would be a valuable service, instructive to any reader who desires a just view of the early history of Christianity. Such a work would at the same time strengthen confidence, as this book aims to do, in the critically tested knowledge which scholars have drawn, and always will have to draw, mainly from more familiar sources — the well-known books preserved by successive generations and studied for centuries past. But to perform such a task requires not only this author's wide acquaintance with modern archæological exploration, but a more discriminating judgment than this book shows as to the exact positive significance of the discoveries for historical knowledge, and with that a clearer understanding of the difference between popular and purely scholarly interests.

The best parts of the book are the summaries of the results of archæological work, such as that at Oxyrhynchus, in Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, at Pompeii, Rome, and other places. These are derived from the writer's own work and from explorers' memoirs; and it is interesting to learn the details of humble life in Egypt, to see pictures of Christian churches and the houses of Christians in Syria in the period from the fourth to the seventh century, or to read the graffiti of lovers and loafers at Pompeii. But very little of all this (that which comes from Palestine least of all) has any relation to Christianity; still less is it capable of throwing any light on the New Testament or on "the life and times of the primitive Church." Great ranges of remote facts like these must indeed be considered by scholars, but for the popular reader much, if not most, of it all is of no use whatever. The most significant subject for the New Testament here treated is perhaps that of ancient conventional forms used in writing letters.

A long section of the book consists of descriptions and lists of more or less recently discovered New Testament manuscripts, especially papyrus fragments. These accounts are obviously inadequate for the scholar, while they are confusing, and, it must in all kindness be added, misleading for the popular reader. One great object of the author's interest seems to lie in pointing out the important verses which accidentally happen to be included in this or the other papyrus scrap. Now apart from the fact that hardly any two pages of the New Testament can be found which do not contain at least one highly prized verse, it is very wrong to give the unlearned public the impression that our knowledge of and confidence in the text of the New Testament depends on such chances as these. We should be just as sure of the substantial trustworthiness of the

New Testament text if these papyri had never turned up. And this is part of a tendency unhappily characteristic of Professor Cobern's discussion of these text-critical matters, which has not been escaped by others who have attempted the same thing. In order to make interesting to a general public facts which are in themselves unimportant except to scholars for their own special purposes, it is necessary to exaggerate the "sensational," "epoch-making," "surprising" importance of these discoveries. For instance, in speaking of a third-century papyrus leaf from a New Testament, the author says that "the whole tone of modern New Testament criticism was changed for the better" by the observation that this leaf was in close agreement with Westcott and Hort's text, and exclaims, "It looked as if the Church of the martyrs possess the same New Testament as our fathers revered." One is disposed to ask who ever doubted this, and also whether we have gone so far that a book first published in 1881 is the Testament of "our fathers." The author himself later remarks (p. 173) that "it must be frankly acknowledged that nothing very spectacular or strange has been brought to light in these sixty or more texts." A slight justification for his exaggeration may be found in the fact that he speaks seriously of the opinion of "some skeptics" that "the present New Testament was either originated by Constantine or much changed by him"!

In the discussion of textual criticism and the accounts of early Christian and other documents lately discovered or more fully studied, the writer gives, as elsewhere, much that can be of interest only to scholars, but for them what he gives is wholly inadequate and is not free from painful crudities and errors. Thus one cannot properly say that the assurance that Tatian's Diatessaron was composed from our four Gospels has "rendered obsolete" the theories of Baur and Strauss (p. 209). To hear of Zahn and Harnack as the contributors to knowledge in the Ignatian question, with no slightest mention of Lightfoot; to read that Cicero is said not to have known Greek until he was over eighty years of age; to find a document well known for centuries described as the "recently recovered" Festal Letter of 367 of Athanasius — if it be indifferent to the simple reader whether such things are correctly and justly stated or not, then they ought not to appear in such a book at all.

It is with reluctance that this criticism is written. It is indeed true that no one could read the book through without having his attention drawn to many noteworthy things in a wide field, some of which have to do with the New Testament or with a more or less early Christianity. The extracts from the Psalms and Odes of

Solomon are worth giving here. And many readers will doubtless pick up one or another fact for which they will be grateful because they can use it. But the scholarship of the book is not sufficient for the exacting demands of its popular purpose. At a moment when America must look forward to taking up scholarly tasks dropped by the shattered forces of other lands, it is disquieting to receive a book like this, which tries to cover a great field with popular encyclopædic information, but which everywhere betrays defective training and shows enough neither of thinking nor of omitting nor of revising.

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

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THE REVIVAL OF THE CONVENTUAL LIFE IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. RALPH W. SOCKMAN. W. D. Gray. New York. 1917. Pp. 230.

It is not often that a thesis for a doctorate merits notice in a quarterly Review. This of Mr. Sockman's does. It is all that a thesis should be — its theme sufficiently worthy, its treatment un-deviating and straight to its end, its learning ample, its sources wide. The author puts his facts clearly, lets the reader draw his inferences, and keeps his own opinions largely to himself.

Many persons will be surprised at the extent to which monasticism in its various forms has prevailed in the Church of England since the Reformation. Mr. Sockman holds that its root is in the desire for the contemplative life, for asceticism, and for increased opportunities of service, and that this root still existed in the Church of England after the Reformation, though its outward forms had been for the most part cut off. Nicholas Ferrar's house at Little Gidding (1625) was the first attempt to embody the conventual idea; and though this was followed by a few others, and though their legitimacy was recognized by ecclesiastical authorities here and there, but little interest was felt in the matter until the French Revolution sent into England large numbers of priests, monks, and nuns. "That which left an abiding influence in England and contributed silently and indirectly to the Catholic revival, was the patience in poverty, dignity in bearing misfortune, exemplary conduct, and holy living displayed by these victims of the French Revolution. Sympathy, admiration, and the fear of Jacobism were all paving the way for the Catholic revival in England" (p. 26).

In the early part of the nineteenth century, increased interest was aroused by the pressure of the problem of surplus and unemployed

women, by the awakened interest in better nursing, and by the increase of foreign travel. Robert Southey advocated the establishment of Protestant Sisters of Charity; and his words kept coming up throughout the century as motive and support to those who were interested in the monastic idea. The first Anglican Sisterhood was proposed as a memorial to him after his death in 1843. "The old principles of Laud and the Caroline divines had never entirely died out, even in the lethargy of the eighteenth century. The Evangelical Movement had raised the standard of personal piety. The Napoleonic wars and subsequent travel had reopened the continent to Englishmen, and given them a view of continental Christianity. The Romantic writers had revived interest in the Middle Ages" (p. 60). All these causes contributed to the rise of the Oxford Movement, and this soon began to lay emphasis on celibacy. Newman, Pusey, and Keble seem to have been at first little impressed with its importance in their scheme. It was Richard Hurrell Froude who stamped it first upon Newman and then upon the whole Movement. Thenceforth the idea that celibacy was more honorable than marriage contributed directly to the establishment of strictly "religious" Orders. In Newman's opinion, the only way to prevent secessions to Rome was to copy its institutions. "I am almost in despair of keeping men together," he writes in 1842. "The only possible way is a monastery. Men want an outlet for their devotional and penitential feelings, and if we do not grant one, to a dead certainty they will go where they can find it" (p. 90).

Religious Orders for women were successfully established almost two decades before those for men. This was largely owing to the beginning of the new movement for enlarging the sphere of women's activities. Higher education for women and entrance into the professions were still in the future. But the well-to-do, unmarried woman was finding home stifling, and her ecclesiastical advisers prescribed nursing, visiting the poor, attending church services, meditation, because these were the only avenues they saw open and because these would stave off more dangerous activities. Mr. Sockman mentions nine of these Sisterhoods that were founded in 1848 and the following decade. Newman made a beginning of conventual houses for men at Littlemore in 1842; but logic asserted itself in 1845, when he and, shortly after, his friends, entered the Church of Rome. A similar experience in case of Faber and his friends added another handicap to the Brotherhood movement in the Anglican Church; and for almost two decades little was heard of Protestant monasteries. In 1862, however, Rev. Joseph L. Lyne

issued a pamphlet advocating the revival of monasticism in the Church of England, and put his ideas into practice by calling himself Father Ignatius, wearing the Benedictine dress, and adopting with two friends the Rule of St. Benedict. His Order, as he called it, grew, though the genuine Benedictines of the Roman Church laughed at his assumptions. His community, however, died with him in 1908; all but half a dozen members, who joined a community claiming to be Benedictine, founded by Aelred Carlyle in 1898. Father Aelred's Order moved to Caldey Island in 1906, and in seven years reached the height of its prosperity — 33 members. Then logic caught it too, and Abbot Aelred saw clearly that "the Divine authority and unity of the Catholic Church were to be found only in union with the Holy See" (p. 181). Dom Bede Camm, a prominent Roman Benedictine, says of the transference of these English monks to the Church of Rome, "This has been the only serious or, so far, successful attempt to introduce the contemplative life into the Anglican communion. The movement has now collapsed, and it is unlikely that any one will hereafter attempt an experiment foredoomed to failure" (p. 182). This prophecy, however, has not been fulfilled; for the Society of St. John the Evangelist, with headquarters at Cowley St. John, Oxford, founded in 1866, is still active; as are also the Society of the Resurrection at Mirfield (founded 1892), the Society of the Sacred Mission at Newark (1893), and the Society of the Divine Compassion at Plaistow (1899).

The aim underlying all these and similar movements is to have Catholicism without the Papacy. This was the issue in the struggle of the first century after the Reformation in England, and the verdict of that period was that the attempt was impossible. The Oxford Movement renewed the endeavor. Many of its followers who succeeded in walking for a time along the narrow edge, toppled over on to the other side. Others today think they have accomplished the feat, and are proud to call themselves Catholics but not Papists. Whether their dream of Christian unity through such Catholicity will become realized, remains to be seen. Some believe that the war is rendering this more likely; others, less likely.

The proof-reading of the book is bad — "misson" for mission (p. 183); "Neale" and "Neal" on the same page (p. 151); a quotation lacks its final marks (p. 134), a parenthesis its final brace (p. 109). The punctuation in general is often meagre and unintelligent.

FREDERIC PALMER.

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RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. WALTER SCOTT ATHEARN. The Pilgrim Press. 1917. Pp. xiii, 394. \$1.50.

"The problem of the book," says the author, "is the *organization* of religious education in the American democracy" (p. viii). To quote the author again, what he gives us is a "blue print to guide future development" (p. 17). If the term "big business" may be used in a eulogistic rather than dyslogistic sense, we are here summoned to big business in religious education as contrasted with the wasteful and ineffective methods of small-shop denominationalism. It is possible, Professor Athearn believes, so to organize a system of coördinated public schools and church schools as to "guarantee to every child both intelligence and godliness" (p. 21). In almost every detail of this ambitious scheme there is reflected a lively, bustling, adventurous, unconventional, pungent mind.

The outstanding requirements of the proposed re-organization may be summarily stated as follows:

(1) It must be entirely separate from the schools of the State — a second complete school system.

(2) In addition to denominational agencies it must include organs, both local and national, that are directly representative of the populace as a whole, and therefore free from denominational control. The author holds strenuously to the opinion that any mere federation of denominational organs or agencies or representatives would subject the common good to partisan interests.

(3) It must be comprehensive, must reach all the way from the kindergarten to the university. In particular, teacher-training will be provided on the high-school level, the college level, and the graduate-college level.

(4) It must provide professional supervision capable of reaching every local community, and available for any church school that desires it.

(5) It must develop methods of its own by direct research of an experimental sort, particularly with respect to "prejudice," sentiment, and ideals, an area of the mind to which public-school methods have given little attention.

(6) It must establish and maintain standards that will enable it to deal with the public-school system, in all matters that require coördination therewith, "on terms of absolute equality" (p. 107).

(7) If one asks where and how such an elaborate organization is to be started, the answer is that a start has been made already in certain community-schools or systems of religious education, notably the one at Malden, Mass., of which Professor Athearn himself is the

head. Such schools, it is believed, could easily be multiplied, and a next natural step would be a general federation or union of them. Moreover, certain existing organizations that are not under ecclesiastical control might be woven into the new fabric. The Religious Education Association is adapted to serve as the professional association of the leaders of religious education. The International Sunday School Association might possibly be reconstructed so as to serve as a general supervisory and promotional body. Even the American Sunday School Union might have a part.

Let no one ignore this scheme on the ground that it is too ambitious to be practical, or even that it is fundamentally defective. For we need to face, not to run away from, the problem that Professor Athearn has attacked so vigorously. Religious education in this country, as far as organization is concerned, is too nearly chaotic to be creditable to the American mind. The drastic analysis of this situation in Chapter IV has not been printed a day too soon. Especial attention may be called to his summary on page 239, a summary of duplications, confusions, and expenses, all of which must be regarded, ultimately, as burdens that the children have to bear.

His fundamental contentions are likely to arouse doubt at one point at least. Is the creation of still another set of religious organizations — organizations that are expected to include the members of all the churches — is this the shortest road to efficiency? If we had to deal with a new element of population, or with a new function, possibly a new set of organs would be best; but no such reason is alleged. Further, some essential questions with regard to the proposed new bodies are touched upon all too lightly. There must be within them, Professor Athearn reiterates, "absolute academic freedom" (p. 154 f.). Just what "absolute" academic freedom means is not clear; certainly the universities claim nothing of the kind for themselves. On the other hand, the community-system of religious education is to be controlled by persons "of the most profound religious experience" (p. 155). One wonders how this item of administration is to be managed, particularly in a system of "absolute academic freedom." One wonders too whether references to what the churches "must" do (pp. 151, 168), and to "granting" to each denomination the "right" to supervise its own religious schools (p. 240), are to be taken as instances of a careless use of language merely or as signs of a state of mind. In relation to this delicate matter one thing is clear in any case: Professor Athearn's assumption that the members of the various religious denominations can actually be induced to enter the proposed non-ecclesiastical

religious organizations is a marked tribute to the growth of liberality within the churches.

Another point on which too little has been said concerns the relation of Jews and Catholics to a religious enterprise that essays to represent the community and the nation. Every detail reads as if the scheme were Protestant. The chapter on "the unification of educational agencies" does not even mention a Catholic or Jewish agency. The Malden system, which furnishes a model, is, in actual operation, as Professor Athearn indicated at the 1918 Conference of the Religious Education Association, an active coöperation of Protestants, with passive acquiescence or non-participation on the part of Catholics and Jews.

A grateful word must be spoken with respect to the general plan of the book, particularly its classified bibliographical lists and its method of raising more questions than it pretends to answer. On the other hand, the typography of the bibliographical notes is about the worst possible, and there are signs of haste.¹ The discussion of the principles of curriculum building, in particular, offers suggestions and headings without taking time or space to indicate clearly what theory of the educative process the author has in mind.

GEORGE A. COE.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

PROTESTANTISM IN GERMANY. KERR D. MACMILLAN. Princeton University Press, 1917. Pp. viii, 282. \$1.50.

In one sense these lectures belong to the large and rapidly growing class of "tracts for the times" produced by the great war; yet in another sense they constitute a historical essay of independent interest and value, such as might be written at any time. The author is President of Wells College, and the lectures were delivered on the Stone foundation at Princeton Theological Seminary in the year 1916-17. They aim to trace the course of German Protestantism

¹ I venture to catalogue the following: P. 3, "average level of . . . intelligence" and "average citizen" obviously do not state the author's meaning; p. 12 confuses moral training with teaching ethics; p. 42, "References on Reconstruction of Educational Theory Due to the World War" are listed under the general heading, "The Parochial Schools"; pp. 148, 224, "McMurry" is misspelled; p. 148, data "is"; pp. 180, 181, the phrase "association of church schools" is used to designate an entirely non-denominational body; p. 199, lines 8-9, "International" is an interpolation and an incorrect interpretation; p. 220, what is meant by "the present graded curriculum"?

as influenced, on the one hand, by the original principles of Luther, and, on the other, by the subjection of the Lutheran Churches to State control. This task is adequately performed.

The author seeks also to point out the bearing of his history upon the present world-conflict, and to show how nations having "the same religious birthright and presumably the same religious training" can "differ so widely in respect to moral ideals and conduct" (Preface, p. iii) as do Germany and the Entente. This inquiry is of importance, and the problem involved has puzzled and bewildered many thoughtful minds.

The author finds at least a clue to the solution of the problem in the fact that in Protestant Germany the super-addition of ecclesiastical authority to civil power, under the territorial State-Church system, offered "opportunity to a strong race of rulers to establish . . . a form of absolute monarchy, such as western Christendom has never witnessed elsewhere." (This statement needs some qualification, and does in fact receive it elsewhere in the book.) The author follows his clue a little farther, and finds that this unfortunate and in the end disastrous policy of Lutheranism rests upon "the mediæval idea of the submission of the individual subject to the prince-bishop in both civil and religious things" (Preface, p. iv). The inevitable consequence of keeping the people in a condition of "perpetual tutelage" was "a real fear of freedom" (p. 278), and of course also a disqualification for its exercise. In the author's words, "the conditions for the formation of healthy and effective public opinion have been absent from Germany largely because the people were deprived of their privileges as Protestants" (p. 253).

It is not, however, to Martin Luther himself — at least not to the fundamental principles of his early and most creative period — that this development is to be traced, but rather to the surrender of those principles in the subjection of the Lutheran Churches to secular authority, whereby true spiritual liberty was placed in jeopardy. "The Lutheran system cultivated the idea that religion and morality were imposed from above, that they could be cared for like sanitation and education, and that it was the sole duty of the layman to obey. The importance of this in the education and development of the people cannot be exaggerated" (p. 249).

In the course of his argument the author finds opportunity to draw several instructive comparisons between the Lutheran and Calvinistic systems, and their effects upon national life (pp. 219, 234, 247, 254). There is also an effective contrast between the religious life of Germany and that of England (pp. 263 ff.).

The book is not free from typographical errors, especially in the latter half. A line seems to have fallen out near the bottom of page 205, and near the bottom of page 241 the correct statements are reversed. There is an index.

JOHN WINTHROP PLATNER.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

S. AGOSTINO. ERNESTO BUONAIUTI. Ed. Formiggini. Roma. 1917.

A small book, but a very valuable contribution to the spiritual history of St. Augustine. The *Confessions*, written more than fifteen years after Augustine's conversion, rather than a true historical autobiography, is a typical demonstration, applied to his own career, of his theories about the work of God in the government and the spiritual pedagogy of the elected souls. Less mystical but more objective indications of the process which led Augustine to accept the Christian faith are to be found in his philosophical works written in the solitude of Cassisiacum, shortly before his baptism (*Contra Academicos*, *De ordine*, *De beata vita*). In the light of what Augustine says in these books his spiritual crisis appears to have been eminently intellectual in character rather than mystical. When in the year 383 Augustine left Carthage to start a school of rhetoric in Rome, his old Manichæan faith was already tottering and his thought was leaning towards Academic agnosticism. His dream of making a fortune in Rome was quickly shattered when, after several months of hard work in teaching, he found his class-room deserted the very day in which his students were supposed to pay their fees. There came in time a vacancy in a chair of rhetoric in the public schools of Milan, and Augustine started for the imperial city of Northern Italy.

But this year of Roman life was not without influence in Augustine's spiritual and moral evolution. It was a very prosperous period for the Roman Church. After the troubles of his election Pope Damasus had successfully strengthened his authority, and a series of imperial decrees bestowed upon him astounding privileges and authority even in civil matters, giving the force of public law to his decisions on Church discipline and faith. Jerome, then the faithful secretary of Damasus and the idol of the Roman Christian aristocracy, was organizing that ascetic revival which later on led to the foundation of the Latin monasteries in Palestine. The pagan element was rapidly sinking down before the blossoming of

the Christian vitality, and it was that very year that by imperial decree the *Ara Victoriae* of the Roman Senate was overthrown and the fate of the old State religion officially sealed. Although in Augustine's writing very little is found about his experiences in Rome, yet there is no doubt that while he made a step further towards agnosticism, on the other hand he was deeply impressed by the powerful organization of the Roman Church, and acquired a better knowledge of the social and political value of Christianity in the Roman world.

In Milan two new factors exercised a decisive influence on his life: the adoption of the Neoplatonic philosophy, which delivered him from the materialistic postulates of Manichæan dualism and from the anthropomorphic tendencies traditional to African theology; and his acquaintance with the great Milanese bishop, Ambrose. In Neoplatonism Augustine found an idealistic representation of the gnoseologic fact, a pure notion of the Godhead, and finally a solution of the problem of evil which had so long distressed his mind. The influence of Ambrose, his impressive biblical exegesis, his aggressive theology, and especially the example of his life of unbounded and heroic devotion to the Christian ideal of a new society founded on righteousness and charity, were no less effective on Augustine's mind. It seems that it was in the solitude of the villa *ad Cassisiacum* near the Alps that he finally realized the gaps which were to be found in the Neoplatonic interpretation of the universe, and that those gaps could be filled only by the dogmas of the Christian faith. Having christianized his Neoplatonism, and being also fully aware of the high value of practical Christianity in social and political life, Augustine was ready for baptism, which was administered to him by Ambrose in the year 387. Of course, the mystical element was not completely absent from this crisis; Neoplatonism itself is permeated with mystical tendencies; but in Augustine's spiritual rebirth mysticism followed and fostered the whole process, but did not create it. It became, however, more and more prominent in the successive stages of his religious life, so that when, almost seventeen years later, he wrote his *Confessions*, his mind was already used to look into his past life through his new mystical conception of the universe, and thus he was led to describe it in terms of his mystical experience. That is why in his *Confessions* he exaggerates the importance of the faults of his youth, discovering a sinful tendency even in the innocent avidity of the baby for the maternal breast, or in the childish theft of some pears from a neighboring garden, and representing as an unpardonable crime his relation with a concubine.

As a matter of fact, we know from the decree of the Toletan council of the year 400 that to live with only one concubine, namely, a woman of inferior condition, as Augustine did, was not even considered as a sufficient reason to exclude a member from the Christian community.

The successive theological evolutions of Augustine confirm such a view of the character of the initial crisis which led him to Christianity. His theology is the theoretical abstraction of his practical daily work in the Church, and his episcopal praxis is simply religious philosophy put into action. Such a theology was not thought of in the solitude of a monastic cell like that of Aquinas, but was shaped and ripened under the strain of practical necessities and of vital polemics on the most various points and frequently in opposite directions. A strong mind, like that of Augustine, could not fail, working under those circumstances, to pass again and again through a sieve his own ideas and to modify them in a substantial way, according to the new religious experiences of which his life was so rich. That happened especially in regard to the greatest problem of Christian ethics — the question of sin and free will.

In the fervor of the Manichæan polemics against cosmic dualism, Augustine emphasized the spiritual nature of God and the negative conception of evil; in this period therefore his affirmation of free will is absolute. But later in the new Pelagian polemics the problem appeared to him under a new light. In the last analysis the question was whether the redemptive action of Christ involved a real and complete palingenesis of the human soul, or a mere perfection of the Law; whether efficient divine grace received through the sacraments is necessary for justification, or whether human nature can reach such a justification by its own original powers. A few years before (396-397) and so between the two great controversies — the Manichæan and the Pelagian — Augustine under the influence of Ambrosiaster's commentary on Romans had modified radically his views about original sin and its deadly effects on mankind.¹ This new pessimistic conception of mankind, as of a *massa damnata*, and the reaction against the Pelagian emphasis on human capacity to work salvation by itself, led Augustine to deny virtually the individual value of every human action and to formulate his famous principle that the free man is not he who has liberty of choice between two alternatives, but only he who follows with joy the will of his master.

¹ See the article "The Genesis of St. Augustine's Idea of Original Sin" published by Professor Buonaiuti in this Review, April, 1917.

The last part of the book deals with Augustine's ecclesiology, and with the religious-social content of the *City of God*. In connection with the latter point, Professor Buonaiuti attacks Professor E. Troeltsch's recent book on Augustine; in which it is assumed that the *City of God* is a mere synthesis of primitive Christian ethics, leading to asceticism and renunciation, and therefore void of any real political value and unable to supply the ideological material for a sound social organization. In fact, Professor Troeltsch, analyzing the political and social elaboration of the Christian world in the Middle Ages, does not discover any trace of a valuable influence of Augustine's thought on the events of that historical period. Professor Buonaiuti starts with criticizing the common erroneous assumption that in the mind of Augustine the City of God is simply the Church. There is no identity between the two institutions. The antithesis between the City of God and the City of Satan is in a moral way applied to the social and political life: the City of God is the society of the idealists and altruists, the City of Satan is the society of the egoists. The passage in Book XIV, 28 is a clear statement of Augustine's thought:

"Two loves built up the two cities: self-love, namely, the egotism which blinds men to despise God, built up the earthly city; the love of God and ideals involving self-sacrifice built up the celestial city. The former takes glory to itself; the latter puts its glory exclusively in the Lord. The former goes after earthly praise; the latter trusts in God revealed in the testimony of conscience. The former proudly lifts up its head; the latter bows humbly to God, saying, 'Thou art my glory and my triumph.' The citizens of the earthly city are dominated by the lust of conquest, which leads them to make slaves of the others; the citizens of the celestial city help each other with a spirit of sweet charity, and fulfil faithfully their social duties."

How to know to which city each of us belongs is evident: "Interroget ergo se quisque quid amet, et inveniet unde sit civis." Christianity, like other mystery-religions, proclaimed the rights and the inviolability of the individual conscience. Augustine developed the social inferences depending logically upon this principle, and set forth the Christian theory that political ethics cannot have a different ground from individual ethics. There is only one fundamental criterion of human values, because there is only one supreme end for human activity — the realization of the divine ideal of goodness. And this is a philosophy of history which is eternal and applies to human history in all its stages.

Such is in a rapid outline the content of Professor Buonaiuti's little book. We cannot say that this estimate of Augustine's

religious crisis as more of an intellectual than of a mystical character is entirely new and wholly original, but certainly it has never been propounded in such a definite way and so well harmonized with the whole of Augustine's intellectual and spiritual career, in a vigorous synthesis of his life and his theology. Being a work of synthesis, there is no room for details in the book. As for the synthesis itself, like all syntheses, it has a personal element, which, however, does not at all diminish the objective value of the study.

G. F. LA PIANA.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN EUROPE (1250-1458). EPHRAIM EMERTON.
Ginn & Co. 1918. Pp. xiv, 550. Maps. \$1.80.

The publication of this new volume by Professor Emerton is an event of great interest to a host of his students and friends. And his students include a very large proportion of all those who have studied history in the last generation, not only at Harvard but throughout the United States. For it is now thirty years since the appearance of his *Introduction to the Middle Ages*. The older of the present generation of professors welcomed this with admiration as the best book on the subject, and used it in their classes. Many of the younger professors now in service began their serious study of history with this *Introduction*. A few years later his *Mediæval Europe* was published, and now we have the third volume in the series.

The author has had a more difficult task than in either of the preceding volumes. In the first the contrast and contact of Roman and Teuton and the influence of the Christian Church dictated the treatment. In the second, "we see Europe wholly under the sway of two vast ideas, feudalism and the Roman Church system." Very different "is the subject of our present study. It is a chapter in human history of which no brief general description can be given. It is impossible to point to any peculiar institutions that govern its life. As we try to unfold the tangled thread of its history, we seem to find only confusion and disorder." But under Professor Emerton's masterly analysis the seeming confusion is straightened out, and we see the orderly evolution of the forces which controlled the period. In order to grasp the important lines of thought the Preface, from which these quotations have been taken, must be carefully read. It is so closely packed with matter that any attempt at condensation is futile. It is summed up, in part, in the following sentence: "This

then will be the natural thread of our narrative: the working out, consciously in literature and unconsciously through social and political conflict, of the idea that individuals or bodies of men voluntarily united in a common interest might, if they pleased, speak and act for themselves." It is a Preface to be studied and pondered over; it suggests questions; it arouses dissent; it compels admiration.

The book begins with a discussion of the principle of the modern State, illustrated by the policies of Frederic II and Louis IX. The treatment of the Constitution of Frederic is especially noteworthy; it is novel and far more informing than any other brief account of this subject. In the chapters on the New Empire and the New Papacy the various lines of policy and the changing constitutional forms are compared and contrasted. Possibly Professor Emerton's method of treatment can be best seen in his chapter on the rise of the middle class. This begins with a statement of the revival of the nominalistic teaching, in opposition to the prevailing realism of the Middle Ages. The new teaching is illustrated by Ockham's *Dialogus* and Marsiglio of Padua's *Defensor Pacis*. This introduction binds together the treatment in the four following sections: on the origin and emancipation of Switzerland, the importance of the merchants and the various leagues of cities in Germany, the democratic movement in Flanders, and the Estates General in France. This is followed by a chapter on the Italian Republics to 1300, where the real elements of Italian unity are made clear. Again, the importance of the middle class is brought out in the summary of the results of the Hundred Years' War. Here the author points out that "in spite of the drain of continuous warfare the productive power of the country was undiminished." The period "was big with the new constructive ideas." "The great cities were growing to be the mainstay of the national principle." Space forbids any attempt to describe the remaining chapters, but mention must be made of the summary of the permanent gains in the conciliar period. These illustrated the general advance in democracy and the emancipation of the nations from papal control.

Professor Emerton hints in the Preface that a volume on the Reformation will follow. This is indeed good news. It must be remembered in judging as to the omissions from this volume. It may well explain why the two chapters on the Renaissance are so limited in scope. Among the subjects which are omitted are the geographical discoveries; the great inventions, except for a bare mention of the printing press; and of course other topics which form the natural background for an explanation of the Reformation.

The maps are unsatisfactory; the execution is poor, the color scheme is not clear, and most of them are too small. The map of the ecclesiastical provinces of Europe is cut to fit the volume by omitting almost all of Spain, one-half of Italy, and other outlying portions. On this map "Mailand" is used for Milan. The map of the Hansa does not extend far enough north to include Wisby.

Throughout the volume the analyses of conditions and summaries of results are masterly. There are many statements which the thoughtful student will remember and will use in forming a judgment as to other periods of history. Those who are impatient with the course of events in Russia may well consider Professor Emerton's statement about the fate of Etienne Marcel: "Like every leader of revolutions he was expected to show in a moment results that need generations of training to accomplish." The temptation is strong to quote many another passage, but any selections would merely reflect the reviewer's own particular interests. Students will profit by this volume in proportion to their maturity and ability to appreciate scholarly work.

DANA C. MUNRO.

PRINCETON, N. J.

AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW. Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. CARL ZOLLMAN. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1917. Pp. 473. Paper, \$3.50; cloth, \$4.00.

This is a useful book upon an important topic not elsewhere so well treated. Books on ecclesiastical law, the internal law of the Church, are not uncommon; but the far more practically important external law of the Church, the law that regulates its legal obligations, its rights of property and contract, its capacity and powers, has not before been brought together into a single volume.

The author has undertaken a difficult task. The Church was coeval with the American colonies; but its ways, its organization, its relation to the governing authority, differed radically in the different colonies. Its disestablishment in the various colonies was a process lasting for two centuries. The differing politics of the prevailing sects in the various colonies led to peculiar legal views of church organization. A law which deals primarily with a Congregational church must differ materially from another which is concerned with a Presbyterian or Episcopalian body. As a result of this variety of materials, the laws of our several states at the beginning of our national life were divergent. The tendency toward uniformity of

law among our states, so strong in commercial topics, is little felt in church law.

In view of this innate difficulty in his subject it is surprising how thorough, how sound, and how readable this book is. The citation of authorities is full; the conception of the differing forms of organization is sympathetic; the conclusions are lawyer-like and convincing. The scope of the work is broad. After an excellent discussion of the legal meaning of religious liberty, the author deals successively with the forms, nature, and powers of church corporations; church constitutions; implied trusts; schisms; the decisions of church courts; exemptions from taxation; illegal disturbance of meetings; contracts; clergymen; officers; holding property by dedication and adverse possession; pew rights; and church cemeteries. A chapter on the Methodist Episcopal Deed concludes the book. The arrangement might be criticized as somewhat heterogeneous; a more logical arrangement of the matter would perhaps have cleared up one or two difficulties. Nevertheless, the seeker may easily find the topic which interests him; he will find it clearly stated, thoroughly discussed in the light of all the authorities, and illuminated by the author's conclusion. At the end of each chapter he will find an admirable and useful summary of the contents of the chapter.

The book will be valuable to all those who are concerned with the temporalities of the Church.

JOSEPH H. BEALE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE ORDER OF NATURE. LAWRENCE J. HENDERSON. Harvard University Press. 1917. Pp. 234. \$1.50.

The fitness of organisms to their environment has been an unceasing wonder to men in general and a fascinating riddle to biologists in particular. No satisfactory mechanistic explanation of this fitness, however, has yet been given. The Darwinian factors act only as pruning shears and not as creative forces. Natural selection may possibly explain the survival of the fittest, but it does not explain their arrival. Doubtful as a theory of physiological evolution, the Darwinian hypothesis is only too obviously inadequate — as Darwin, Huxley, Kropotkin, and many other biologists have repeatedly pointed out — as an explanation of social evolution. Nevertheless, largely through the influence of such biologists as Haeckel and Weismann in Germany, the dogma of the *Allmacht* of natural

selection in racial progress has been made the foundation of Teutonic political and military policies. The world is now suffering the terrible consequences of pseudo-science and pseudo-philosophy carried out into rigorous action by the military masters of a nation. Fortunately for the world, England has had wiser scientific and political leadership. This, however, is somewhat aside from the main point of this review. But it goes to prove that scientific theories, however abstract and apparently impracticable, may nevertheless have the greatest influence upon the welfare of the human race. In the opinion of the reviewer, Henderson's *Order of Nature* is a book which will strongly influence the scientific thought of the future.

In his thoughtful book on *The Fitness of the Environment* Dr. Henderson discussed the problem of organic fitness from an original standpoint, calling attention especially to the reciprocal character of this fitness. Not only are organisms adapted to their environments but the world is discovered to be "the fittest possible abode for life." In saying this, however, it should be understood that Professor Henderson has in mind not the purely biological problem of the lock-and-key relationship of organism and environment, but the more inclusive problem of the fitness of the world to life in general. Failure to understand his problem has misled several critics of this earlier work.

Theological readers will find *The Order of Nature* interesting for at least two reasons — first, because the book is a masterly survey and summary of the history of teleological thought from Aristotle to Bosanquet, and, second, because the author, mechanist as he is, is nevertheless led after a careful analysis of the problem of the order of nature to accept the conclusion of Aristotle that "the contrast of teleology and mechanism is the very foundation of the order of nature, which must ever be regarded from two complementary points of view." Such a view coming from a theological writer would not be in the least surprising, but coming from a mechanistic thinker it appears symptomatic of the clearer perception on the part of the younger generation of scientific men of the inadequacy of a purely mechanistic interpretation of nature. The teleology which Professor Henderson thinks he discovers in nature, however, is not of the anthropomorphic sort. He will have none of that.

He attempts to demonstrate a hitherto unrecognized order among the properties of matter and to examine the teleological character of this order. He states his problem as follows: "The simpler and more general problem of the teleology of nature as a whole has been

neither recognized nor investigated by science. Yet the problem is now clear enough. All men admit in the teleological appearance of the world something that is real. There is order, stability, and a richly varied collocation of material objects at the basis of it. When we think of the solar system, the meteorological cycle, and the organic cycle, we distinguish that which quite inevitably and directly impresses us as harmonious. Now, as we have seen, it is no longer permissible to doubt that this impression of harmony corresponds to an order in the universe. No doubt science must put aside the philosophical problems which thus arise, and philosophy must deny to all men the right to found a system of natural theology upon the fact. But it is a false and discredited metaphysical hypothesis which leads to the denial of the order of nature as a subject of scientific research. How then is the production of this order to be scientifically explained? What is the mechanistic origin of the present order of nature? . . . The real scientific problem may be approximately solved by discovering, step by step, how the general laws of physical science work together upon the properties of matter and energy so as to produce that order." Thus the problem is an evolutionary one.

Special stress is laid by Professor Henderson upon the unique properties of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, which are such as to lead to the presence of water on the earth and of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere as well as to the meteorological cycle, which "regulates the temperature of the globe more perfectly than it could be regulated by any other substances concerned in any other similar cycle." Their chemical properties "lead to an even greater variety of chemical combinations and chemical reactions, to an unequalled diversity of properties in their products." Thus they make up "the most remarkable group of causes of the teleological appearance of nature."

Professor Henderson logically concludes that "the properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen make up a unique ensemble of properties, each one of which is itself unique. This ensemble of properties is of the highest importance in the evolutionary process, for it is that which makes diversity possible. To this end it provides materials, and in large measure the necessary stability of conditions. We have already seen that diversity, as Spencer declared, is radically necessary to evolution. . . . We may therefore conclude that there is here revealed an order or pattern in the properties of the elements. This new order is, so to speak, hidden, when one considers the properties of matter abstractly and statically, for it is recognizable and intelligible only through its effects. It becomes evident only when time is taken into consideration. The environment into which life enters

is indeed 'the fittest.'" The organism, however, "so we fondly hope, is ever becoming more fit, and the law of evolution is the survival of the fittest."

"Nor can we look upon either of these peculiarities of the matter which makes up the universe as in any sense the work of chance or as mere contingency. There is in truth not one chance in countless millions of millions that the many unique properties of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, and especially of their stable compounds, water and carbonic acid, which chiefly make up the atmosphere of a new planet, should simultaneously occur in the three elements otherwise than through the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them together. There is no greater probability that these unique properties should be without due (that is, relevant) cause uniquely favorable to the organic mechanism. These are no mere accidents; an explanation is to seek. It must be admitted, however, that no explanation is at hand. . . . Hence we are obliged to regard this collocation of properties as in some intelligible sense a preparation for the processes of planetary evolution. . . . Therefore the properties of the elements must for the present be regarded as possessing a teleological character."

"It will perhaps be objected to this argument that the cause of the peculiar properties of the three elements is conceivably a simple one, such as the properties of the electron. This is perfectly true, but quite beside the point. For, whether simple or complex in origin, the teleological connection — the logical relation of the properties of the three elements to the characteristics of systems — is complex. This complex connection is almost infinitely improbable as a chance occurrence. But the properties of electrons do not produce logical connections of this kind, any more than they produce the logical connections of the multiplication table; for, like the properties of the electrons, such relations are changeless characteristics of the world. Such is the one positive scientific result which I have to contribute to the teleological problem."

In reaching the important conclusion that the properties of the elements are somehow a preparation for the evolutionary process, Dr. Henderson suggests that such a hypothesis has two defects: "In the first place, the term 'preparation' is scientifically unintelligible. Secondly, this hypothesis is not only novel but it is different in kind from all recognized scientific hypotheses. For no other scientific hypothesis involves preparations except those which originate in the organism. In short, we are face to face with the problem of design." Knowledge of the history of human thought, however,

leads Professor Henderson to avoid the use of the term "design." Consequently he modifies his statement, and asserts that "the connection between the properties of the elements and the evolutionary process is teleological and non-mechanical. . . . According to the theory of probabilities, this connection between the properties of matter and the process of evolution cannot be due to mere contingency. Therefore, since the physico-chemical functional relationship is not in question, there must be admitted a functional relationship of another kind, somewhat like that known to physiology. This functional relationship can only be described as teleological. . . . Therefore the contrast of mechanism with teleology is at the very foundation of the order of nature."

Henderson's argument is briefly summarized as follows: "The principal peculiarity of the universe which makes diversity of evolution possible is original and anterior to all instances of the processes which it conditions. And we may recall the fact that this peculiarity consists of a group of characteristics such that they cannot be regarded as merely contingent. Finally, it will be remembered that *the relation of this group of properties to the characteristics of systems is also such that it cannot be merely contingent*. I believe these statements to be scientific facts. If this be so, we have arrived at the solution of a special case of Aristotle's problem of 'the character of the material nature whose necessary results have been made available by rational nature for a final cause.'" Therefore, the conclusion seems necessary that "the contrast of mechanism with teleology is at the very foundation of the order of nature, which must ever be regarded from two complementary points of view, as a vast assemblage of changing systems, and as an harmonious unity of changeless laws and qualities working together in the process of evolution."

The broad scope of the book is revealed in its chapter headings — Aristotle, The Seventeenth Century, The Eighteenth Century, Biology, Nature, Evolution, The Problem, The Three Elements, The Teleological Order. There is in addition an Appendix with brief but important essays by Clerk Maxwell and Fechner. The book will greatly enhance the reputation of its author as a master of the larger problems of science — the *Magnalia Naturæ*.

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